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Abstract 
 
This research examines the role of news media in contributing to perceptions and feelings 
of political polarization present in contemporary American society. I argue that the media’s 
framing of the American electorate as in the midst of a “culture war” perpetuates the 
misperception that the public is deeply divided on issues and may contribute to growing feelings 
of hostility and social distance among the parties. Scholarship has demonstrated that the U.S. 
Congress is highly polarized along ideological lines, but has turned up considerably less 
evidence of ideological polarization within society. The idea of a polarized public may not be 
evident from the survey data on ordinary Americans, but it lives on the pages of newspapers 
throughout the United States and is becoming a more popular news frame over the past two 
decades. Content analysis of national and regional newspapers documents the media’s increasing 
portrayal, from 1988 to the present, of American society as in a culture war. An original 
experiment, embedded in an Internet survey, tests how media stories of polarization influence the 
perceptions, feelings, and attitudes of Americans. The finds are mixed. News depicting political 
polarization can indeed lead readers to see parties and their supporters as even further apart, 
though this is true of stories portraying either societal and congressional polarization. On the 
other hand, these stories had, if anything, a moderating impact on levels of affective polarization 
relative to the control group.    
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Preface: The Puzzle of Polarization 
 
 
Sitting alone in the living room of my apartment my eyes are focused on the television 
screen as I continue to consume massive amounts of midterm election coverage. The 2014 
midterm elections were particularly exciting for me due to the way they resonated with my 
project. Every television news outlet I scanned alluded to a culture war of some kind, whether it 
was Red and Blue America or the reportedly extreme divisions within the American electorate. 
Brian Williams said that purple disappeared from the map altogether as Colorado turned red with 
the election of Senator Cory Gardner. News teams looking at exit polls came to the conclusion 
that American voters are definitely polarized. Fox News reported a complete and total division 
among the public, and ABC News claimed the significant plunge in the number of split ballots 
indicated most voters stuck to party lines. This experience was invigorating because it not only 
reinforced the relevance of my research, but my question was front and center. It was the star of 
the show.  
Just a couple months later as I was basking in the snow of northern Chicago during the 
holiday season, I was blessed with a gift from a University of Michigan communications 
professor. Susan Douglas published a personal column on December 15, 2014, in In These 
Times, entitled “We Can’t All Just Get Along.” The column begins with a short and simple three 
word sentence: “I hate Republicans.” The article continues to discuss her disgust with 
Republicans, or as I might put it: my thesis in action with particular relevance for Ann Arbor. 
Douglas’s sentiments are especially interesting because she worked for Republican Senate 
Minority Leader Fred Lippitt from Rhode Island in the 1970s. Thus her political evolution 
reflects the shift over time in issue positions of the Republican Party in Congress as well as the 
social or affective aspect of polarization. She even cites the most recent work of Shanto Iyengar 
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and Sean Westwood regarding polarization along party lines within the American electorate. 
Looking at comments from her RateMyProfessor.com profile, her liberal (and anti-Republican) 
views seem to manifest themselves outside of her column and within the classroom. Comments 
on her profile page from former students include “Prof. Douglas gets a bad rep because a lot of 
the students don’t buy into her liberal foundation” and “[s]he can be fun to listen to but her 
lectures have an underlying liberal tinge.” Furthermore the editor’s note displayed on the Internet 
version of the article expressed their wish to rename the article “It’s Okay to Hate Republicans” 
and their removal of many reader comments that were threats to Douglas’s life and personal 
safety—a further illustration of the affective hostility characterizing partisan polarization today. 
The evidence on polarization gathered by social scientists to date presents an interesting 
puzzle. There is considerable consensus that the ideological space, the range of issue positions, 
in Congress today is divided into two highly distinct camps: liberal Democrats and conservative 
Republicans. There is even agreement concerning the existence of ideological polarization 
among issue activists and political elites more broadly. This ideological polarization, however, is 
not nearly as clear at the societal level. While the majority of scholars believe that both 
Democrat and Republican politicians and issue activists are becoming more extreme today, there 
is no such consensus regarding the political polarization of society. Maximalists like Alan 
Abramowitz believe that the general public’s views mirror those of the political elite and have 
become more extreme over time. In contrast, minimalists like Morris Fiorina claim that the 
public remains centrist while a partisan sorting process has simply led to more sharply-defined 
ideological political parties.  
Complicating the picture, however, there are potential dimensions of mass polarization 
beyond issue distance that relate to the social distance and affective polarization between 
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partisans. For example, Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes argue that voters increasingly dislike their 
opponents that Democrats tend to automatically dislike Republicans and visa versa (2012). Like 
Fiorina, they do not see polarization arising in terms of policy preferences, but nonetheless they 
do believe polarization is arising in the form of increasingly negative sentiments (“affect”) 
towards the opposite party. With the increasing hostility between Democrats and Republicans, 
partisans associate negative traits with members of the out-group party, both politicians and 
voters. These findings give rise to a puzzle: If partisan voters have not moved very far in terms 
of issues and ideology, then why has their animosity toward one another grown?   
The media, in the eyes of Fiorina, is primarily responsible for painting a picture of an 
ideologically polarized public. They have used the idea of a “culture war” to sell the news. 
Political conflict and disagreement make a more interesting story compared to consensus and 
compromise. The media has created the view of the American people as fighting a culture war 
through the “misrepresentations of election returns, lack of hard examination of polling data, 
systematic and self-serving misrepresentation by issue activists, and selective coverage by an 
uncritical media more concerned with news value than with getting the story right” (Fiorina, 
Abrams and Pope 2011: 8). Thus, though the policy positions of the public may have remained 
largely centrist, the media has created the impression of a public deeply divided along 
ideological lines. Is this media distortion the cause of the affective polarization witnessed by 
Iyengar and colleagues? Although Fiorina claims that the media is incorrectly portraying the 
public, he does not test this portion of his argument. He presents systematic data on neither the 
content of media coverage nor the causal relationship between that coverage, on the one hand, 
and the perceptions and feelings of voters, on the other hand. This is where my project comes in.  
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To more fully understand what is happening in terms of political polarization in the 
contemporary United States, this thesis takes a two-step approach that links together the claims 
of Fiorina and Iyengar. First, I conduct a content analysis of national and regional newspapers to 
investigate the extent to which contemporary news coverage is characterized by the media frame 
of a polarized American electorate. Media frames alter considerations. By highlighting certain 
aspects of a topic—in this case, the purported polarization, or ideological gulf, dividing 
Democrats and Republicans—such a media frame can influence how readers think about events, 
issues, or even their fellow citizens. Second, to test whether this sort of media frame is a cause of 
affective polarization I carried out an experiment. This experiment examines media frames of 
both a polarized Congress and a polarized society, and measures their impact on feelings, 
perceptions, and issue preferences. It is with this data that we gain a more comprehensive view 
of the puzzle. Fiorina and Iyengar pieced together the fuzzy edge pieces of the puzzle and I will 
attempt to fill in some of the center tiles. I hope to come to a better understanding of what 
polarization the public perceives to be occurring at both the congressional and societal level in 
addition to the extent of ideological and affective polarization among voters.   
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Literature Review 
 
 
The current debate surrounding polarization in American politics serves as a launching 
point for the present investigation. I begin with a very brief history of news writing to understand 
the evolution of journalism in relation to its impact on public perception. While I seek to 
understand the sources and extent of polarization at the societal level, which remain under 
debate, current scholarship offers a fairly strong and consensual picture of ideological 
polarization at the congressional level. Lastly, to provide some context for thinking about media 
influence on perceptions and feelings of polarization, I will discuss agenda setting, priming, 
framing, and the current media landscape.   
 
A Very Brief History of the American News Media 
 
 
In thinking about media effects, it’s important to take a brief look at the history of 
newsmaking. Understanding the history and trajectory of newsmaking is very telling of the 
political implications of news stories. History shapes the way news is written and disseminated 
today. The “partisan press” ruled from the late 1700s through the early 1800s. This era of news is 
characterized by journalism as the political mouthpiece of ruling politicians (Schudson 2002). 
The press mobilized elites and loyalty directed funding and staffing. The “penny press” or 
“commercial media” adapted to changes in printing and transportation technology. As newspaper 
circulation rose, writing became more politically neutral to appeal to larger parts of the market 
and gain revenue from private advertising. This more homogenous news product was well 
received in the public from a rise in education. The late 1960s marked a distinct shift in reporting 
as journalists transformed from “lapdogs” to “watchdogs” (Schudson 1995). The trust in the 
news media and credibility of the institution was at an all time high as journalists took a more 
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critical approach in an effort to hold politicians accountable for their actions (Patterson 1993). 
The current news environment is characterized by interpretative coverage in which facts are 
considered within a context or framework of meaning offered by the journalist (Downie Jr. and 
Schudson 2009). Scandal and conflict sells newspapers and the credibility of the media has 
plummeted. This is the media landscape against with which my research is situated. 
Contemporary journalistic norms encourage the coverage of congressional conflict and quite 
congenial to a media frame, such as that at the center of my research, which portrays American 
society as deeply divided between antagonistic worldviews and lifestyles.  
 
Congressional Ideological Polarization 
 
 
Legislative gridlock has become the status quo in Washington with the highly polarized 
nature of Congress and the Democrat and Republican parties. The ideological distance between 
the two dominant political parties is the largest recorded gap going back to the Civil War 
(Jacobson 2013: 689). The decrease in moderate and centrist politicians produces what we see at 
the congressional level, the state of affairs which we call ideological polarization. The issue 
positions within each dominant political party have homogenized leading to greater disparity 
between the two parties, which has opened a no-man’s land for moderates. Data shows 
Republican politicians becoming significantly more conservative, with Democratic politicians 
shifting towards the left. Jacobson finds that “elite polarization is firmly rooted in electoral 
politics” and thus cannot be undone without significant changes to the American electoral 
process. The current electoral institutions favors more extreme political candidates, which forces 
the moderate American electorate to choose between the two extremes on the ballot. America’s 
governing institutions such as “the bicameral legislature, presidential veto, and separate electoral 
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bases and calendars of representatives, senators, and presidents” are naturally prone to gridlock 
(Jacobson 2013: 690). In addition, the political polarization evident at the congressional level 
represents the interests of the voters on the extremes better than the interests of “middle-of-the-
road voters” (Poole and Rosenthal 1984: 1061).  
The pervasive issue of elite polarization leaves the American legislative process prone to 
stalemate. Another implication of congressional polarization is that members of Congress have 
no incentive to support the President (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Polarization causes even 
members of the President’s own party to have less reason to support him. In this case, the 
legislative process is prone to additional conflict and stalemate. This conflict can be further 
compounded by the dynamics of a divided government. A divided government occurs when the 
President’s political party is opposite from the majority party in the House of Representatives or 
the Senate via elections. With a divided government, it is much more difficult to pass legislation 
as Congress and the President have conflicting issue positions and agendas. This situation is 
evident in the current (114th) Congress as there is a Democratic executive branch and a 
Republican majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate.1  
It is also important to understand how recent polarization within the American political 
system has occurred. The principle of representative democratic elections holds that candidates 
generally “represented a diverse set of regional issues” (Hare and Poole 2014: 412). Political 
parties vary internally and externally by nature. Internally, there are intentional differences 
within each respective party due to geographic location. The geographic interests can provide 
common ground among members of different parties to pursue legislation beneficial for their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This stalemate was front-page news when President Obama vetoed Congress’s Keystone XL 
bill in February 2015 and Congress’s attempt to defund the Department of Homeland Security in 
order to counteract Obama’s executive order concerning immigration. 
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district and state. Externally, there are overarching differences in terms of social and economic 
policy preferences. The emergence of recent polarization within Congress can be attributed to the 
decrease in internal diversity and thus the cross-cutting potential of geography.   
Polarization among political elites has implications for the public at large. Polarization 
among politicians and issue activists has solidified their parties’ ideological positions. This 
clarification of the political sphere for ordinary Americans has “increased party importance and 
salience on the mass level” (Hetherington 2001: 619). In addition, Hetherington asserts that 
changes in public opinion and behavior of the American electorate are reflections of elite or 
congressional behavior. He cites “changes in the behavior of Republican and Democratic elites 
as the engine for an issue evolution on race in the 1960s” and that the public takes cues from 
observing elite behavior (Hetherington 2001: 622). Using this logic, polarized elites and 
politicians should precede a polarized public. This claim will be assessed and discussed further 
below. Another effect that can impregnate the American electorate through elite level 
polarization is Layman and Carsey’s concept of “conflict extension” which is defined as “a 
growth in mass party polarization on multiple distinct issue dimensions” (2002: 786). Looking at 
three major domestic policy agendas (social welfare, racial, and cultural issues), they argue that 
the polarization of Democratic and Republican elites should elicit an ideological response among 
mass policy attitudes due to the fact that “party elites structure the political choices offered to the 
mass public and thus play an important role in the development and expression of citizens’ 
views” (Layman and Carsey 2002: 788). This shift in policy attitudes is dependent on two 
factors: strength of the individual’s party affiliation and knowledge of the pervasiveness of 
polarization at the congressional level. Therefore mass ideological polarization should 
theoretically emerge given the current state of polarization among political elites. The average 
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voter, however, is generally not interested in or in tune with the everyday events of Washington. 
Any awareness of polarization at the elite level should bring about some sentiment of 
polarization at the societal level, whether it be ideological, affective, or behavioral.  
 
The Debate Over Ideological Polarization Within Society 
 
 
But what is the state of polarization in the American public? Does it mirror the 
developments and patterns at the elite level? The current notion of a “culture war” infiltrating 
society certainly suggests there are visible and extreme ideological differences among the 
American electorate, but these claims may be superimposing the image of political elites onto the 
map of society. “The culture war refers to a displacement of the classic economic conflicts that 
animated twentieth-century politics in the advanced democracies by newly emergent moral and 
religious ones” (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011: 2). This “culture war,” however, does not truly 
exist in society for minimalists like Fiorina. He asserts that the media is responsible for the 
creation of the perception of societal conflict because stories of disagreement and political 
gridlock make a more compelling and profitable newspaper than compromise and consensus. In 
reality, the American electorate is moderate in their views, taking centrist policy positions while 
the media distorts their policy preferences (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011). Media coverage 
tends to interpret society as ideologically polarized from the pattern of close presidential 
elections since 1988, but such a pattern does not necessarily imply that the public is polarized: it 
can signify that there are equal numbers of voters who strongly prefer one candidate over the 
other, equal numbers of voters who like both candidates, or equal numbers of voters who do not 
have strong feelings regarding either candidate. Thus, the typical social issues that define a 
“culture war” seem to only pertain to the phenomenon of political polarization among those most 
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likely to engage in political behavior: political elites, politicians, and issues activists as opposed 
to the public at large (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006: 94).  
Another study on ideological polarization within the American electorate assesses twenty 
years of data from the General Social Survey and National Election Study. Dimaggio, Evans and 
Bryson found a significant decline in variance among issue positions (1996). While this study 
was done almost twenty years ago, it demonstrates a lack of severe polarization in terms of 
popular wedge issues including race, crime, and gender. There was some variance among issue 
positions concerning abortion and poverty, but the division within these issues declined over the 
twenty-year observation period.2 They draw an important distinction defining polarization as 
“both a state and a process. Polarization as a state refers to the extent to which opinions on an 
issue are opposed in relations to some theoretical maximum. Polarization as a process refers to 
the increase in such opposition over time” (Dimaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996: 693). For the 
purpose of my research, I am focusing on polarization as a state, that is, the extent of polarization 
or opinion extremity within society today. With more extreme issue positions there is a greater 
tendency towards conflict and the inability to compromise, something that is being widely seen 
at the congressional level. Dimaggio and colleagues hint at the advent of affective polarization 
when they say “the greater the extent to which social attitudes become correlated with salient 
individual characteristics or identities, the more likely it is that they will become the foci of 
social conflict” (1996: 693). The concept of opinion polarization was ultimately evident when 
comparing data between different subgroups such as education level, race, religion, region, and 
political ideology. Political party affiliation was the only factor to show a significant divergence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This study used data from the early 1970s to the middle 1990s. In addition, to overall public 
opinion, they broke down analysis into subset populations including voters, political activists, 
college graduates, and young people. Ultimately, there was no statistically significant data to 
demonstrate a trend towards great polarization.  
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in issue positions and attitudes leading to the conclusion that “social attitudes of groups in civil 
society have converged at the same time that attitudes of party identifiers have polarized” 
(Dimaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996: 738). 
Fiorina argues that there is a lack of ideological polarization within society, Dimaggio 
argues that ideological polarization is only present in certain subsets of the population, and other 
social scientists argue that there has been an increase in ideological polarization within society in 
the past few decades. Using data from the American National Election Studies, Abramowitz and 
Saunders found evidence indicating a rise in ideological polarization since the 1970s (2008). 
Based on the seven-issue scale in Abramowitz and Saunders’s research design, the percentage of 
respondents at the low end of the polarization scale fell from 39 percent in the 1980s to 32 
percent in the mid-2000s, but respondents at the high end of the polarization scale rose from 24 
percent to 33 percent. These statistics provide evidence that ideological thinking is more 
prevalent among the American public today and runs counter to Fiorina’s claim that the public 
holds moderate issue positions. The well-defined political division between liberal Democratic 
and conservative Republican political beliefs over the past twenty years has supported the idea of 
significant differences between red state voters and blue state voters and between secular voters 
and religious voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008: 542). 
 
Societal Affective Polarization 
 
 
The extent of polarization in the electorate remains a matter of dispute among political 
scientists, but the focus of the debate for the past decade or more has been largely on ideological 
polarization—whether Americans are deeply divided in their views on political issues. Recently 
researchers have asked whether citizens have become divided in their feelings toward one 
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another—affective polarization—no matter the policy differences between them. Adopting a 
social psychological lens, these political scientists argue posit that societal polarization is 
emerging as a socially driven phenomenon. Specifically, Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes argue that 
citizens increasingly dislikes their opponents (2012). Therefore increasingly negative sentiments 
towards the opposite party, rather than policy preferences, define contemporary society’s 
“culture war.” Partisanship is key for this phenomenon because identification with a political 
party activates out-group dislike (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012: 406). Affective polarization is 
then reinforced, they argue, through exposure to media campaigns that have a tendency to be 
saturated with attack advertisements and negative messages. Along with increasing dislike 
toward the opposing party, partisans ascribe negative traits to members of the out-group party. 
This increase in affective polarization could result from ideological polarization, but there turns 
out to be only a “weak association between ideological and affective polarization” in contrast to 
the impacts of negative campaigns and selective exposure (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012: 
424). These findings nonetheless demonstrate that there is an additional dimension to 
polarization. The emergence of a polarized public may not derive from real differences in issue 
positions within society, so much as from the media-constructed images of demonized enemies 
activating strong party identities to create social distance between partisans. 
Polarization based on social differences is “cultural in nature, that is, about fundamental 
values and beliefs that are more threatening to social stability” (Muste 2014: 433). By measuring 
favorability or antipathy towards in-groups and out-groups the degree of social conflict in society 
can be assessed. Muste found that polarization has not increased when looking solely at in-group 
favoritism and out-group hostility in terms of issue position. “Disagreements among the mass 
public about issues and values, no matter how contested, have not (yet) extended into direct 
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inter-group antipathy” (Muste 2014: 439). This overarching conclusion reinforces Iyengar, Sood, 
and Lelkes findings that social group animosity is more prevalent than partisan differences in 
issue positions (2012). This finding seems to indicate that partisan ideology and political 
attitudes about public policy are separated from emotions about social groups.  
 
Partisan Sorting and Behavioral Polarization 
 
 
The third prong of polarization, behavioral, is inherently tied to partisan sorting. Partisan 
sorting is defined as “an increasing correlation between party and ideology” (Mason 2012: 3). 
Highly polarized political parties are better at sorting individuals on the basis of their policy 
preferences. Thus society is not polarized along ideological lines, but merely sorted into more 
ideologically-coherent political parties (i.e. partisan sorting). Mason argues that although issue 
positions in the public have not changed significantly enough to denote major ideological 
differences between ordinary Democratic and Republican partisans, a view that is consistent with 
minimalists like Fiorina, partisan sorting has polarized political behavior of the American 
electorate. Political behavior is innately driven by an individual’s political identity, which is 
responsible for “political bias, political participation, and political emotion” (Mason 2012: 5).3 
Individuals can have different identities in regards to ideological preferences and religious 
beliefs, but the alignment of these identities polarizes political behavior. When group identities 
are non-aligned, people are generally more tolerant and less biased towards out-groups. Thus as 
the political sorting process solidifies, partisan identities become more closely aligned with other 
identities, generating behavioral polarization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This phenomenon is independent of ideological polarization because partisan sorting is an 
alignment of opinions creating more cohesive political parties as opposed to the radicalization of 
opinions. 
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One fear of behavioral polarization and partisan sorting is the underrepresentation or 
exclusion of particular interests within American democracy (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). 
Individuals who hold more extreme views that are consistent with the polarized parties are the 
most likely to engage in political behavior. At the same time, “over the last 40 years, American 
public opinion has remained stable or even become more moderate on a large set of political 
issues” (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008: 419). This can lead to increasing inequality through 
differential lobbying activity, campaign donations, and voting. Voting is the essential civic duty 
through which citizens exert their political influence, but the polarization of parties coinciding 
with partisan sorting can skew the American electorate (e.g., leaving it more heavily dominated 
by those higher on the socio economic scale).4  
Behavioral polarization “affects political interactions and a person’s understanding of the 
political world, as well as the vehemence with which they react emotionally to political events” 
(Mason 2012: 25). It can occur while issue positions are held constant. Thus the extremity of 
issue positions or out-group dislike, Mason argues, is not necessarily the underlying mechanism 
of societal polarization. Even absent these, society may become behaviorally polarized via a 
more effective partisan sorting process and subsequent identity alignment. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The 1970s marks the beginning of modern polarization among parties in Congress via multiple 
social factors. These factors include Southern realignment, where Southern whites increasingly 
voted for Republican candidates starting during the Civil Rights Movement, income inequality, 
and immigration. Citizens with lower socioeconomic statuses and immigrants, who generally 
constitute low-income workers or non-citizens, have lower levels of political participation or 
engagement. This has shifted the position of the median voter to a higher socioeconomic status 
(Hare and Poole 2014: 420). Therefore, redistributive welfare spending policies are no longer as 
appealing as they have been in the past.  
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Media Effects: Political Persuasion and Selective Exposure 
 
 
What role, if any, might the media play in creating or exacerbating political polarization 
in the contemporary United States? The concept of political persuasion is particularly helpful in 
understanding how media effects can promote polarization. Political persuasion involves the 
reinforcement of preexisting ideas, mobilization of the electorate, a learning process about 
campaigns, and conversion of perspectives. John Zaller’s “Receive-Accept-Sample” (RAS) 
model demonstrates the method in which partisan messages can be internalized (1992). The 
model says that public opinion is influenced by elite discourse on current events. The basic 
assumption of this theory states that the level of an individual’s political knowledge will 
determine whether or not the partisan message will be persuasive. Thus, an individual with 
sophisticated political knowledge will be less likely to be persuaded by counter-attitudinal 
messages from elites than an individual with little political knowledge. This occurs because 
individuals with previous, sophisticated political knowledge already have the information 
necessary to counteract and neutralize the message (Zaller 1992).  
In addition to the RAS model, motivated reasoning can also impact the effect of exposure 
to partisan media sources on political attitudes. Motivated reasoning follows a more instinctive 
and automatic process, one in which attitudes can change in the opposite direction of the 
message (Kunda 1990). This means that a conservative message can make a liberal’s attitude 
even more liberal whereas the RAS model would argue that the attitude of a liberal with little 
political knowledge could become more conservative. When exposed to neutral news, the RAS 
model and motivated reasoning can lead to polarization. Using the RAS model, balanced 
newscasts polarize attitudes “when recipients can use source cues to differentiate conservative 
and liberal arguments… or when they reject counter-attitudinal arguments based on prior 
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knowledge” (Prior 2013: 109). In the motivated reasoning framework, however, neutral or 
balanced news can lead to polarized attitudes when partisans choose to dismiss counter-
attitudinal arguments and accept information consistent with their personal views (Prior 2013). 
While RAS and motivating reasoning offer two different explanations for the acceptance or 
rejection of persuasive information, both frameworks identify situations in which partisan and 
neutral news can polarize attitudes.  
The concept of accepting or rejecting news based on its correspondence with partisan 
beliefs has become easier and more prevalent with the proliferation of partisan news outlets. This 
proliferation has increased the ability of Americans to select news products such as 
ideologically-driven websites or partisan blogs. Selective exposure refers to the selection of 
media outlets that match one’s beliefs and predispositions (Sears and Freedman 1967). Selective 
exposure reinforces partisan views and decreases exposure, even incidental exposure, to counter-
attitudinal messages that are vital for creating a well-informed American electorate. Selective 
exposure increases the potential polarizing power of popular ideological media outlets and 
brands such as Rush Limbaugh and Keith Olbermann, especially on Americans with low 
political knowledge. Despite these concerns, empirical research remains mixed and concludes 
that public opinion is not swayed by these partisan messages because “citizens ignore them, 
resist them, or take them for granted” (Prior 2013). Prior found that “although political attitudes 
of most Americans have remained fairly moderate, evidence points to some polarization among 
the politically involved” (Prior 2013: 102). These politically involved constitute a minority 
within the American public, but it is also important to mention that they constitute an influential 
minority.  
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Media Influence Theories 
 
 
Theories of agenda setting, framing, and priming, are widely understood as indirect 
effects of political communication (Iyengar 2011). By covering some issues and ignoring others, 
the media influences which issues people view as important and thereby set the agenda for 
American politics. The impact of agenda setting, however, is moderated by political awareness 
and personal relevance. Thus agenda setting effects will be largest for those who have low 
political awareness or for whom the issue is personally relevant. The media also plays a role in 
how large the agenda setting effect can be by the plausibility and prominence of the story. 
Plausibility refers to the relation to national significance. For example, a story connecting to 
American security or interests will have larger effects than a story about European security or 
interests in the U.S. market. There is also a positive correlation in regards to prominence, the 
more often a news story is discussed or presented as a lead story the more likely it is the issue or 
event will be viewed as an important agenda item (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Media attention 
can trigger policy action and therefore news can alter legislative agendas and influence public 
opinion. Through television news experiments, Iyengar and Kinder found that partisanship plays 
a role in the pervasiveness of this media effect, as Democrat and Republican partisans are less 
susceptible than Independents and non-identifiers to agenda-setting. By continuously writing 
about differences between Democratic and Republican partisans, news media may be making the 
issue of societal polarization increasingly salient whether or not these news stories are accurately 
depicting reality.  
Priming has a more direct link with public opinion. By calling attention to some matters 
while ignoring others, news media influences the standards and criteria by which governments, 
presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged. This media effect may account 
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for some of the dissatisfaction with Congress and the President in regards to news stories. A rise 
in stories about congressional and societal polarization may affect the way citizens judge the 
President, their representatives, and other elected officials. While priming usually refers to the 
way the President is judged, it depends on the degree to which the viewers’ connect the problem 
to the target population (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
Framing is a crucial indirect effect of political communication. Simply put, framing alters 
relevant considerations. By highlighting some aspects of an event or issue and ignoring others, 
media influence how people think about that event or issue. Media frames will be directly 
manipulated in the experiment portion of this research to understand a) what polarization is 
present at the societal level and b) what the public perceives from news messages. Together 
framing and priming impacts the way in which the American public views and understands 
politics. Ultimately, “voters can be moved from indecision to strong preferences depending only 
on TV news coverage” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 112).  
 
The Changing Media Landscape 
 
 
The media landscape, now more than ever, has optimized the ability of citizens to self-
select into viewing (or not) partisan news stories with the advent of the Internet and cable news 
channels. The growth of cable television and the Internet has proliferated the number of non-
public affairs news sources. The increase in viewing and reading options marks a distinct shift 
from the 1950s news options of ABC, CBS and NBC (Turrow 1992). The changing media 
landscape has a correlative effect on political behavior. The voter turnout gap between news and 
entertainment fans has widened within the last twenty years because entertainment fans tend to 
be less partisan. Without inadvertent news exposure, registered voters are less likely to show up 
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to the polls. This drop in turnout rates demonstrates the current campaign environment is 
dominated by politically involved elites (Prior 2013). Thus the enemy here may not be partisan 
selective exposure to Fox News or MSNBC, but the conscious decision to watch entertainment 
programming such as ESPN and reality television. “The expansion of media choice can polarize 
elections in the absence of any attitude change, reinforcement, and polarization” because the 
media environment can generate more partisan voting behavior (Prior 2013: 107). Furthermore, 
network news audiences are dwindling while “online, ethnic and alternative media” are seeing an 
increase in general audience growth (Chinni 2004). The combined prime time Nielsen shares of 
the ABC, CBS, and NBC, networks totaled at least 90% from the late 1940s until the mid-1970s, 
but by 1990 the three networks’ share had declined to 65% (Turow 1992). The proliferation of 
news and entertainment outlets, seen through an idealistic lens, has the ability to reach a larger 
portion of the American electorate and thus empower more voters to fulfill their civic duty. In 
reality, it has been shown to create more partisan elections where voter turnout is monopolized 
by politically knowledgeable citizens and elites.  
The Internet’s ability to empower the American electorate has been a point of much 
contention within today’s media landscape. One side of the debate argues that new technology 
will create an ideal media environment outside of the interests of media conglomerates and 
corporate power. On the other hand, the proliferation of news sources fragments audiences and 
reduces exposure to political news that is vital for democracy. Ultimately, the impact of the 
changing media landscape is dependent upon consumers: their incentives and strategies for 
selecting specific news outlets. Baum and Groeling compared news content from overtly partisan 
websites and sources that attempt to avoid political affiliation like the AssociatedPress and 
Reuters. Readership of partisan websites demonstrated an ideological filter in their news 
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audience suggesting a preference to consume news that directly aligns with their issue positions 
(2008). The newswires from the AssociatedPress and Reuters, however, did not show evidence 
of news selection based on its implications for the reader’s ideological orientation (Baum and 
Groeling 2008). Overall, selective exposure is a key factor for online partisan news organization, 
but nonetheless their audiences remain small in comparison to mainstream media outlets.  
The impact of new media outlets on political polarization has yet to reach concrete 
conclusions. The Internet and social media have been used in arguments for the intensification of 
polarization because they enhance the average voter’s ability to self-select news or avoid 
political news coverage altogether. The publication medium can determine the type of coverage 
as well. “Most newspapers in the United States publish in one-paper markets and thus cater to an 
ideologically heterogeneous audience” (Prior 2013). Cable and Internet news outlets, on the 
other hand, face a competitive national market in which there is no incentive to appear moderate 
for an economic advantage. Talk radio shows, cable news channels and websites offer more 
ideologically extreme packages of news. That said, “[e]vidence for attitude polarization—
individuals changing their issue positions, ideological convictions, or partisan sentiments to 
produce less centrist, more sharply opposed aggregate distributions of the most politically 
relevant attitudes—turns out to be ambiguous” (Prior 2013: 104). The Internet is much more 
accessible to the public and offers a wider range of news stories in comparison to the same five 
stories that dominate network news broadcasts. Thus, the American public is simultaneously 
being exposed to a homogenous product on national news broadcasts and a diverse product of 
ideological or entertainment news on cable and online. In addition, online news organizations 
have become more concerned with disseminating the news than with collecting it. This has been 
interpreted as placing increased pressure on journalists to maintain quality, credibility and trust 
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in the media (Chinni 2004). “Between 1985 and 2002 the number of Americans who think news 
organizations are highly professional declined from 72 to 49 percent” (Chinni 2004: 98). This 
statistic further complicates the impact of media coverage, as the news media has lost the trust of 
its audience. With less trust, news frames may not have an impact on the way society views 
Congress or themselves.   
 
Finding a Causal Relationship with Media 
 
Causal relationships are tough to detect in media studies. Influence can occur in both 
directions, with an interaction between political attitudes and media consumption choices. The 
media tends to serve as a primary source of political information. In the late 1900s, exposure to 
television news increased the likelihood that an individual would vote in the presidential 
election. More recent research has theorized that the increase in cynicism about the American 
political process among voters is a result of changes in election coverage and media behavior in 
the late 20th century (Patterson 1993). The use of game schema in which political candidates are 
portrayed as strategic actors as opposed to policy leaders and civil servants dominates 
journalists’ writing. Game schema employs battlefield metaphors, horse-race coverage and 
shorter soundbites in its repertoire of reporting, which tend to crowd out policy concerns. In 
addition, coverage of politics as conflictual and strategic in the United States can take the 
conversation away from the concrete facts of the policy debate and lend a cynical tone to overall 
political news (Cappella and Jamieson 1997). The change in media frames and the adoption of 
cynical tones for campaign coverage shifts the focus away from candidates’ issue positions to 
attract larger audiences. Ironically, the sheer pervasiveness of cynical political coverage in the 
American media garners larger news audiences and can improve levels of political knowledge 
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among consumers (Patterson 1993). Evidence shows a positive correlation between media 
exposure and political knowledge, interest and efficacy (Curran et al 2014). The directionality of 
the relationship is difficult to decipher as the media may be a reflection of public opinion or it 
may be shaping public opinion. This two-way street complicates the ability to come to an 
unambiguous, definitive conclusion about the directionality of media influence.  
23 
 
Media Content Analysis 
 
 
This section of the thesis empirically examines evidence for Fiorina’s claim that media 
hypes and distorts the image of American society fighting a culture war at home. I consider both 
the episodic (illustrative) evidence offered by Fiorina in his book and systematic content analysis 
data on news media coverage that I collected. The goal of this investigation is narrowly focused 
on ascertaining whether the news media have in fact extensively and increasingly pushed a 
culture war frame as descriptive of American politics. I therefore discuss over-time trends in 
media portrayals of political polarization in both national and regional sources.  
 
Research Methods 
 
 
As a reminder, Fiorina claims that the media has misrepresented election returns and 
falsely portrayed the political views of the American pubic. To investigate these claims a bit 
further, I used content analysis to assess whether the frequency of polarization coverage has risen 
over the past thirty years in the United States in both national and regional newspapers. The 
content analysis utilized two different media archives to obtain articles dating back to 1988: 
LexisNexis and NewsBank. LexisNexis contained archives of coverage from The New York 
Times and The Washington Post between 1988 and today. NewsBank was a particularly helpful 
database when looking at the frequency of coverage at the regional level, because of the broad 
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number of regional sources present in the archive.5 I examined the frequency of polarization 
coverage during three specific time periods: 1988-1992, 1998-2002, and 2008-2012. The 
database searches flagged articles containing the phrases “culture war,” “Red America,” and 
“Blue America.” These search terms imply that polarization is not just something happening in 
the halls of Congress, but happening within society. In the very name culture war the media 
evokes the idea that the country is deeply divided. “Red America” and “Blue America,” not just 
red states and blue states, is largely a shorthand for journalists to talk about two different 
societies in one country (rather than sorting states by political preference). The content analysis 
was constrained purposefully to news and opinion articles (excluding letters to the editor) in an 
attempt to eliminate false positive search results such as lifestyle pieces about polarized lenses or 
pop culture references. The search was further narrowed by a focus on story subject via pre-
programmed lists in the online databases including government and public administration, 
presidents, and elections and campaigns.  
Each time period—1988 to 1982, 1998 to 2002 and 2008 to 2012—contains an even 
distribution of elections which enables easy comparison across sources in a given time period. 
Thinking logically, the presence of midterm and presidential elections is more conducive to the 
frame of a polarized American electorate. Elections increase the amount of coverage dedicated to 
politics, especially surrounding the issue positions of candidates and voters. The first time frame, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Regions were determined by the database’s categorization of states. New England comprises 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont. Middle 
Atlantic comprises New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. South Atlantic comprises 
Washington D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. East North Central comprises Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin. East South Central comprises Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. West 
North Central comprises Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, and 
South Dakota. West South Central comprises Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
Mountain comprises Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and 
Wyoming. Pacific comprises Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.   
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1988-1992, and the third time frame, 2008-2012, contain two presidential elections and one 
midterm election, while the second time frame, 1998-2002, contains one presidential election 
and two midterm elections. The second time frame is the subject of Fiorina’s book as its first 
edition was published in 2004. Newspaper evidence in Fiorina’s book dates back to 1992, but the 
bulk of his evidence was published between 2003 and 2004 (Table 1). By analyzing trends in the 
frequency of stories depicting a split America before, during, and after this time, I am better able 
to evaluated Fiorina’s assertion about media’s frame of a culture war in society. Also, if this is 
the time period during and since which Iyengar and others seem to have found some growing 
inter-partisan hostility, then documenting news patterns over a similar period helps to establish 
(or set aside) any potential foundation for hypothesizing the media as a possible cause.  
 
Table 1: Yearly distribution of news articles cited in Fiorina’s book6 
Year Number of Articles 
1992 1 
1996 1 
1998 1 
2000 5 
2001 3 
2002 8 
2003 11 
2004 17 
2005 11 
2006 6 
2007 4 
2008 9 
2009 2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The first edition of Fiorina’s book was published in 2004, but he has since released two more 
editions. This table includes all articles in the third edition of “Culture War? The Myth of a 
Polarized America.” 
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The first timeframe used in the content analysis, the late 1980s and early 1990s, is 
particularly important for the idea of polarization within the American electorate as the 
contemporary idea of “culture war” was conceived. Although initially advanced in the work of 
sociologist James Davison Hunter (1991), Republican candidate Pat Buchanan put a primetime 
spotlight on the term “culture war” at the 1992 Republican National Convention. Buchanan said, 
“[t]here is a religious war going on in this country, a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation 
we shall be as the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America” (1992). The term 
culture war typically refers to the moral and religious conflicts that have arisen in U.S. politics 
since the 1960s, as opposed to the classic economic conflicts rooted in earlier Twentieth Century 
politics. It splits Americans into two camps: traditional and progressive. The emergence of this 
idea came closely on the heels of the emergence of the religious right as a strong force within the 
Republican Party in the 1980s. The year 1988 has specific resonance in relation to Fiorina’s 
claim about the media’s interpretation of close elections reflecting a society deeply divided. The 
1988 election would mark the last year for a decade and a half in which any presidential 
candidate won a majority of the popular vote. Ultimately, “by themselves close election 
outcomes cannot tell us whether half the electorate hates the other half or whether everyone is 
flipping coins” (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011: 15).  
The second timeframe, 1998 to 2002, potentially offers a different sort of critical moment 
because it includes a major national event of singular importance: September 11, 2001. Fiorina 
acknowledges the anomaly of 9/11 and its opposing effects on the talk about a “culture war.” 
The terrorist attacks were widely seen as providing an at least brief moment of national unity and 
decreased internal conflict. Nonetheless, this is the same time period, for which Fiorina first 
expressly rejects the idea of voters as polarized, despite the increasing lack of ideological overlap 
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within both the House of Representatives and the Senate. In addition, with the 2000 election 
came a “pictorial representation of the culture war in the form of the red and blue map of the 
United States” (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011: 4). The closeness of the election results was 
interpreted as a deeply divided nation, when as already noted, Fiorina contends that it can also be 
seen as merely a closely divided nation.7 Fiorina examines USA Today’s “One Nation, Divided” 
feature written by Jill Lawrence to highlight the media’s role in painting the picture of a 
polarized America. This February 18, 2002 newspaper feature chose to focus on two polar 
opposite towns Montclair, New Jersey and Franklin, Tennessee to demonstrate the political 
differences between red states and blue states. Montclair has organizations and groups to the left 
of the political spectrum like chapters of Amnesty International and the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, while Franklin has organizations and groups to the right of 
the political spectrum like Christian World Broadcasting and the Middle Tennessee Home 
Education Association (Lawrence 2002). Fiorina has an issue with this media profile because 
Montclair overwhelmingly supported Gore and Franklin overwhelmingly supported Bush during 
the 2000 election. This article is a prime example of the media’s infatuation with the frame of 
societal polarization and the selection of extreme cases to support that frame.  
The last timeframe, 2008 to 2012, brings us closer to the present and is thus crucial for 
understanding media’s role today in shaping perceptions surrounding the phenomenon of 
polarization. This media content analysis aims to demonstrate the trend of media coverage on the 
issue of societal polarization. In addition to the database key terms searches, I briefly skimmed 
each article to eliminate false positive results. Fiorina conjectures that since the inception of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 President Bill Clinton won 43.01% and 49.23% of the popular vote in the 1992 election and the 
1996 election respectively, neither of these percentages accounting for a majority. President 
George W. Bush won his first term with 47.87% of the popular vote in 2000 and won a minimal 
majority of the popular vote during his re-election in 2004 with 50.73%.   
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term “culture war” there has been an increasing number of articles characterizing the public as 
polarized in political news and editorials. The media frame of a polarized American electorate 
emphasizes terms such as “culture war,” Red America, and Blue America to signal issue and 
social distance among everyday citizens mirroring the gridlock of Congress. The data displays 
clear pattern: an increase in the number of stories over time dedicated to the ideological 
differences between the two parties, between regions of the United States, and between ordinary 
partisans.  
 
Data and Trends 
 
 
Overall, the data strongly reinforces Fiorina’s claim that the press has been increasingly 
painting the picture of a polarized society. Specifically there is a significant increase between the 
first and second time periods for both The New York Times and The Washington Post. The trends 
for the two newspapers are indeed strikingly similar (Table 2, Table 3). There were even more 
stories written about the culture war in the final time period and, in raw numbers, a larger 
increase between the second and third time period studies as well. In addition, the raw data tells a 
story about the frequency. The first time period for The Washington Post had a total of 13 stories 
about societal polarization, which breaks down to an average of just over two stories per year, 
though the bulk of those stories were written late in the period around the advent of the term 
“culture war” and Buchanan’s speech. The last time period for The Washington Post had a total 
of 267 stories about societal polarization, which breaks down to an average of four or five stories 
month. But of course the average masks periods of higher concentration. For example, in 
February 2012, The Washington Post published 20 articles concerned with the “culture war,” 
coming close to a story every day. With this level of repetition, especially in the last time period 
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analyzed, it can be concluded that the media is reinforcing the frame of a polarized American 
society.  
 
Table 2: Number of stories using the media frame of societal polarization in The New York 
Times and The Washington Post 
 1988-1992 1998-2002 2008-2012 
New York Times 6 103 254 
Washington Post 13 80 267 
 
Table 3: Percentage change for articles using the media frame of societal polarization in 
The New York Times and The Washington Post 
Percentage Change8 Time 1-Time 2 Time 2-Time 3 Time 1-Time 3 
New York Times 1617% 147% 4133% 
Washington Post 515% 234% 1954% 
 
Figure 1: The New York Times  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Percentage change equation !!!!   𝑥  100 
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Figure 2: The Washington Post 
 
 
 
When the “culture war” search is further broken down into Red America and Blue 
America there is the same overall trend but on a much smaller scale.9 This can occur because 
some of the more recent articles focus solely on one party as opposed to the overall composition 
of partisans in the American electorate. One such example includes “Blue-State Blues” published 
August 3, 2009 in The New York Times by Ross Douthat. This opinion piece specifically cites 
Obama’s speech during the 2004 Democratic Convention in which he insists there is only one 
United States of America as opposed to a Red America and a Blue America. Generally searching 
for Red America or Blue America will pull up similar results, but the specificity draws certain 
distinctions between stories such as those concerning Sarah Palin and her supporters and Rachel 
Maddow and her supporters. For example, one article from the Blue America search outlines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Data tables from these searches can be found in the appendix.  
13 
80 
267 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
1988-1992 1998-2002 2008-2012 
N
um
be
r 
of
 a
rt
ic
le
s p
or
tr
ay
in
g 
th
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
 p
ub
lic
 a
s p
ol
ar
iz
ed
  
Year Published 
Washington Post 
  31 
 	  
Obama’s constituencies and traces his actions in the 2012 campaign to voter turnout and the 
demographics he carried.10  
The number of articles between The New York Times and The Washington Post not only 
seem to be somewhat comparable for every time period, but have similar peaks and valleys in 
each time period which I observed during the data collection process.11 While conducting the 
searches, I noticed that the number of articles written about societal polarization tended to 
increase around the 2012 election focusing on the fact that Republican Presidential nominee Mitt 
Romney is a Mormon. This finding follows the idea of a “culture war” in which the religious and 
moral characteristics of the presidential candidate is the more relevant focus of the newspaper 
article as opposed to his policy positions in areas of defense, healthcare or education. Some 
popular keywords brought up throughout the search included gun control, abortion, stem cell 
research, evangelicals and social issues.12   
In addition to looking at major national newspapers, I looked for the media frame of a 
polarized American electorate in more regional sources. For these newspapers, I hypothesize that 
there will be a similar pattern—that is, a rise in this media frame over time—to that of The 
Washington Post and The New York Times, but to a smaller degree. Most of the newspapers have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The article discussed here is “Red Versus Blue in a New Light” by Andrew Gelman and Avi 
Feller published on Monday November 12, 2012 in the Opinion section. It is important to note 
that Gelman is a political scientist at Columbia University who has published a book and 
numerous papers on polarization. 
11 If I had more time, money, and access to archival articles I would have broken down the 
content analysis research further looking at the month-by-month breakdown around campaigns 
and election. I hypothesize that stories about a polarized American electorate will be a more 
routine frame during these particular points in time as opposed to the summer in an off-election 
year.  
12 Headlines from the content analysis searches include the September 6, 2009 article “What is 
blue in ’08, red in ’09? Ask Virginia?”, and the January 23, 2001 article “Not even Big Bird 
would be safe in this culture war” from the The Washington Post, the June 1, 2008 article 
“Taking their faith, but not their politics to the people” from The New York Times, and the 
September 18, 2009 article “The ‘Culture War’ is Real and Scary” from The Miami Herald. 
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smaller circulations and a more circumscribed geographic hub; as a result, there are fewer 
column inches dedicated to the federal government and national politics. A regional or local 
focus also translates, in many (though not all) settings, into discussing political communities that 
are more homogenous even from the perspective of the culture war frame. Local newspapers, 
however, do devote more attention and column inches to political races in state and local 
legislatures. Ultimately, the results were consistent with the hypothesis as we observe an increase 
in the number of stories devoted to the media frame of a polarized electorate over the three time 
periods, even if they were considerably fewer in number compared to The Washington Post and 
The New York (Table 4). Clearly the culture war frame spread beyond a few elite sources and 
seeped into political coverage throughout the American news media. Not surprisingly, the 
polarized frame was mostly used to describe politics on a national level as opposed to a local 
level. 
 
Table 4: Regional Newspaper Analysis 
Region Paper 1988-
1992 
1998-
2002 
2008-
2012 
New England New Haven Register 0 5 24 
Middle Atlantic The Philadelphia Inquirer 3 15 41 
South Atlantic The Miami Herald 0 10 40 
South Atlantic Charlotte Observer 4 15 21 
East North Central Chicago Sun Times 9 17 28 
East South Central Lexington Herald–Leader 0 10 23 
East South Cetnral The Anniston Star (AL) 2 12 32 
West North Central Omaha World Herald 1 7 13 
West South Central The Houston Chronicle 4 18 41 
Mountain The Desert News (AZ) 2 19 32 
Pacific San Francisco Chronicle 0 15 34 
Pacific The Oregonian  3 14 34 
 
Every regional newspaper I analyzed followed that same pattern: very few stories 
regarding the “culture war” in the first time period, about 10 to 20 stories regarding the “culture 
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war” in the second time period, and double that amount of stories regarding the “culture war” in 
the final time period. Newspapers that contained the most stories using the “culture war” media 
frame came from publications in large metropolitan cities including San Francisco, Miami, and 
Philadelphia. Smaller cities including New Haven, Lexington, and Omaha published an average 
of 20 stories in the final time period using the media frame of societal level polarization, 
breaking down to approximately four stories a year.13 While this may not seem to make a 
significant difference, the increase in the use of the polarized public media frame over the past 
twenty years signifies a strikingly consistent pattern from which we can expect the number of 
stories, even in small cities and towns, will increase in the years to come.  
Topics discussed on the regional level are consistent with the hot button issues discussed 
in The Washington Post and The New York Times, including religion, gay marriage, drugs, and 
gun control. One such example includes “White House must be high if it thinks war on drugs is 
defensible” from the June 19, 2011, edition of the New Haven Register, or “Social Issues: in gay 
marriage fight, some brands take a stand” from the July 28, 2012, edition of The Houston 
Chronicle. Education was an increasingly prevalent topic throughout the three time periods 
analyzed in regards to the “culture war.” The Houston Chronicle published four articles, two in 
July 2010 and two in November 2012 about the influence of this societal conflict entering 
schools.  
The clash between liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, and politics 
and religion were emphasized throughout the regional newspapers. The Chicago Sun Times 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 These cities were not intentionally picked. The cities were determined by the availability of 
online archival articles dating back to 1988. If more archival articles were available in the time 
frame I was looking at, I would have picked a few newspapers from each region (for example, 
one from a more rural city and one from a major city in the region with a larger readership to get 
a better picture of media frames on the regional level). 
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published articles entitled “Family Values Need Protection” and “Free Ideas Suffer in Liberals’ 
Culture War.” The connection between political parties and obvious hostility or incivility was 
demonstrated in articles including “GOPs out renewing America’s ‘culture wars’” from The San 
Francisco Chronicle and “Conservative fears U.S. ‘barbarism’ – Clinton acquittal seen as 
collapse of culture” from The Houston Chronicle. This focus on the differences between parties 
paints the picture of an ideologically polarized Congress infiltrating the American electorate, but 
it also seems to signify—and may contribute to—the growing sense of affective polarization. An 
emphasis on differences and partisan identity can bolster psychological out-group dislike among 
readers (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). 
Overall the findings of this brief content analysis confirmed Fiorina’s claim that the 
media is spreading the story of the polarized American electorate. He asserts that there is an 
inherent journalistic bias in their exposure to politics, mainly interacting with politicians, interest 
groups, and issue activists. All of the column inches dedicated to “questions of partisan and 
ideological bias” have normative implications for the public as it may signify a change in news 
values (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011: 22). News values refer to what is deemed to be news in 
the eyes of journalists, those who make decisions on what is printed and published. This suggests 
that the media frame of societal polarization is becoming an increasingly important angle for 
journalists, despite its lack of empirical evidence. 
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Experimental Methods and Data 
 
 
The content analysis from the previous chapter serves as the foundation for my 
experiment. Having established that there is an increase in the use of the media frame of a 
polarized American electorate, the next step is to investigate the impact of this sort of media 
message on the public’s perceptions and feelings of partisan polarization. The news messages 
prevalent in the content analysis were adapted into two experimental treatment conditions. In this 
chapter, I lay out specific hypotheses regarding the expected effects of these treatments, as well 
as describe the basic design of the online survey experiment, how the data was collected, and the 
measurement of key variables.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
I hypothesize that the media frame of a polarized American electorate will have an 
impact on both the perceived levels of ideological polarization and the reported levels of 
affective polarization. First and foremost, the societal polarization group, which is the treatment 
condition reading the article “A Nation Divided by Red and Blue” (described more fully below) 
will report the highest levels of perceived differences in issue positions within society and the 
highest levels of social distance and/or out-group dislike. The congressional polarization group, 
which is the second treatment condition reading the article “Congress Divided by Red and Blue,” 
will report similar effects to that of the first treatment condition, but to a lesser extent. I am 
beginning with the assumption that issue positions will be fairly centrist among all respondents 
regardless of treatment conditions. This will be measured in the experimental survey, as there is 
a section related to the respondents’ policy positions on issues such as gay marriage, 
immigration, welfare spending, and English as the official language.  
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Press coverage indicating that the American electorate is 
polarized will increase the perceived levels of ideological polarization and will 
increase levels of affective polarization among respondents.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Press coverage indicating that Congress is ideologically and 
affectively polarized will increase the perceived levels of ideological polarization 
and affective polarization among respondents. But these effects will be smaller 
than what is observed among those who read that the American electorate as 
polarized.  
 
 
Research Methods 
 
 
In this section I will discuss my research methods in detail. The results of the content 
analysis revealed a trend in the media portrayal of the American electorate as an increasingly 
politically polarized entity over time, but this does not constitute evidence of a causal 
relationship between media coverage and public attitudes.14 Having established this trend 
nationally and regionally, the search for media effects can proceed in an experimental setting. An 
experiment is better suited to isolating the capacity of the news media to shape perceptions 
regarding polarization. Using a between subjects research design with fictional and personally 
manipulated news articles portraying a polarized Congress and a polarized American electorate, I 
am able to draw conclusions about the extent to which these sorts of news stories affect both 
ideological and affective polarization within society. With random assignment of subjects, it can 
be assumed that the mean level of individual feelings of each group is the same. Thus any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This finding is consistent with Fiorina’s claim about the media’s portrayal of the American 
public. 
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significant differences in data between groups can be attributed to the treatment condition, the 
news stimulus. Experiments allow for stronger causal inferences because the investigator is able 
to eliminate competing explanations while controlling the atmosphere and stimuli for study 
participants.  
Experiment groups were created through the manipulation of news articles. The 
experiment contained three groups—a control group and two treatment groups. I used a “pure” 
control group for this research, which translates to the absence of any news article. The control 
group completed the survey except for the text introduction to the treatment article, the 
corresponding follow-up article questions, and the manipulation check. One treatment group 
discussed ideological and affective polarization within Congress, and the other treatment group 
discussed ideological and affective polarization within the American electorate.15 Both articles 
were nearly identical and were created by compiling current news stories from The New York 
Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal in addition to the news articles discussed in 
Fiorina’s book.16 The goal is to see how, if at all, the media frame used affected a) respondents’ 
views of polarization in Congress and society and b) their feelings towards their own and the 
opposite political party. The treatment groups were led to believe that they were participating in 
a study to better understand the messages and clarity of political news articles. This deception 
was particularly helpful to distract participants, in order to avoid demand effects in which 
subjects try to anticipate the goals of the research and adjust their behavior accordingly.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 From here on out I will refer to treatment group one as congressional polarization and 
treatment group two as societal polarization. 
16 The full text of the treatment articles can be found in the appendix.  
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Survey Characteristics 
 
 
Respondents were told that they were taking a ten-minute survey about media and 
politics with keywords including survey, demographics, media, and politics. The survey, created 
in Qualtrics, began by requesting basic demographic information as well as religious importance, 
media consumption habits, and political identification. Many of the questions used in the 
demographic and media habits section are taken from previous political science research studies, 
think tanks, and well known measures including the American National Election Studies, Pew 
Research Center, and the polarization work of Iyengar and colleagues (Iyengar, Sood, Lelkes 
2012). These questions should increase the validity of the data because they have been widely 
used in similar scholarly contexts and, in many cases, have been thoroughly evaluated as 
measurements. The survey was broken into 24 question blocks: demographic, race, education, 
religion, party identification, ideology, media consumption habits, attention check, article 
questions, polarization perceptions, elected officials’ willingness to compromise, political 
discussion, trust in government, ideological placement, party favorability, issue positions, 
partisan social identification measure, social distance, party affect batteries, party description 
checklist, job approval, participation, manipulation check, political knowledge, and income.17 
These blocks will be discussed later in this section as to their measurements and connection to 
the independent and dependent variables.  
Below is an image of the screen participants in the randomly assigned treatment groups 
encountered after the initial set of questions. The experiment stimulus is disguised as a front-
page article from The New York Times to increase the credibility of the news story and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Complete text of the survey can be found in the appendix. 
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heighten realism (Figure 3). Participants in the control group received no intervention and 
continued with questions regarding polarization perceptions, social distance, and issue position 
preferences. The survey was bookended by an introduction and a debriefing message. The 
introduction was part of the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey information for eligible 
respondents and contained a consent form (see Appendix). The debriefing section corresponded 
to the specific treatment condition. Those in the control group ended the survey with this 
message:  
This survey is part of a scientific research project being conducted 
at the University of Michigan. We are studying how the portrayal 
of political polarization by the news media is shaping the views of 
ordinary American citizens.  
 
Once again, your responses are very valuable for this important 
research and we appreciate the time you have taken to participate. 
 
Those in the two treatment conditions of a polarized Congress and a polarized American 
electorate had a variation of the message above.  
This survey is part of a scientific research project being conducted 
at the University of Michigan. We are studying how the portrayal 
of political polarization by the news media is shaping the views of 
ordinary American citizens.  If you read a news story during this 
survey, it was fictional (created specifically for this study), 
although its content was inspired by and adapted from recent real 
news stories that appeared in newspapers such as The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. 
 
Once again, your responses are very valuable for this important 
research and we appreciate the time you have taken to participate. 
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Figure 3: Screenshot of experimental stimulus 
 
 
 
Participants in the two treatment groups had the same survey with a few additional 
questions (not present for control subjects) regarding the clarity and informative nature of the 
article, to further distract participants from the true objective of the study. Treatment surveys also 
included a manipulation check to assess how closely participants had read the news article. At 
the end of the survey, respondents in the treatment groups were asked to report the main message 
of the news article they read earlier:  
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Do you remember which of the following answers conveys the 
main message of the article you read earlier? 
a. Decreased levels of polarization in Congress 
b. No change in polarization of Congress 
c. Increased levels of polarization in Congress 
d. Decreased levels of polarization in the American public 
e. No change in polarization of the American public 
f. Increased levels of polarization the American public 
 
 
The majority of respondents in the treatment groups correctly answered the manipulation 
check confirming that they were properly exposed to the experimental stimuli. In treatment 
group one, the group who received a story about congressional polarization, 85.4% of 
respondents chose the correct answer. In treatment group two, the group who received a story 
about societal polarization, 82.6% of respondents chose the correct answer.  
 
Sample 
 
 
The study was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). This platform is 
beneficial for the quick collection of low-cost data from a large, diverse, random sample of 
adults (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012). AMT is an online service in which Internet users are 
paid small fees, in this case $1.50 for the first batch of respondents and $1.70 for the second and 
third batch of respondents, to perform Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT). A HIT is defined as “a 
question that needs an answer” and “represents a single, self-contained task that a Worker can 
work on, submit an answer, and collect a reward for completing” (Amazon Mechanical Turk). 
AMT Workers were recruited to complete my Qualtrics-programmed survey and then randomly 
assigned to the experimental conditions. The survey and associated methods were reviewed by 
the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Health and Behavioral Sciences 
in December 2014 and were determined to be exempt from additional oversight. The only 
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requirements for MTurk Workers to complete tasks on AMT and receive compensation were a 
computer with an Internet connection and to be at least 18 years old. Entry to the survey was 
restricted to MTurk Workers with a HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 95% (based on 
their performance on prior tasks). Furthermore I chose to limit users based on geographical 
location, an American IP address, and “number of HITs approved greater than or equal to 1000” 
(Amazon Mechanical Turk). This was done to ensure that every survey respondent is 
theoretically a voting-age American citizen and thus that the sample population is representative 
of the target population and somewhat established within the MTurk Worker community.  
External validity issues are a primary concern when using AMT. Berinsky, Huber and 
Lenz investigate whether “estimated (average) treatment effects are accurate assessments of 
treatment effects for other samples and whether these estimates are reliable assessments of 
treatment effects for the same sample outside the MTurk setting,” (2012: 354). These concerns 
are particularly threatening to the generalizability of experimental results if the sample 
population is unrepresentative of the target population. The target population for my research is 
all voting-age Americans. Survey respondents ranged from age 18 to age 71, with a mean age of 
35 and a standard deviation of 11. In addition, most of the survey respondents cluster around the 
24 to 32 age range. When looking at the raw data, most of the respondents were Democrats 
(58.5%). Only 21.9% of respondents were Republicans and 19.6% of respondents were 
Independents (Table 5). These numbers indicate that I can better draw conclusions about 
Democratic and Independent partisans, but there is inherently a Democratic Party identification 
skew in AMT political science samples. Ultimately the AMT “sample does not perfectly match 
the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the U.S. population but does not present a 
wildly distorted view of the U.S. population either” (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012: 361). Thus 
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the MTurk population serves as a diverse pool of subjects, especially in comparison to other 
convenience samples, and has been suitable for replicating canonical experiments in social 
sciences. Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 depict a few additional descriptive demographic statistics 
of the respondents in my sample.  
 
Table 5: Distribution of respondents by party identification 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Democrats 368 58.5% 
Republicans 123 19.6% 
Independents 138 21.9% 
Total 629 100.0% 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of respondents by race 
Race Number of Respondents 
White or Caucasian 530 
Black or African American 45 
American Indian or Alaska Native 13 
Asian 49 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 1 
Other 13 
Total 65118 
 
 
Table 7: Distribution of respondents by Hispanic ethnicity19 
Spanish, Hispanic or Latino descent R Percentage 
Yes 52 8.3% 
No 577 91.7% 
Total 629 100.0% 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For the race question, respondents were allowed to select multiple options. Thus, some people 
are counted more than once, and this table shows the number of times each category was 
checked.  
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To address issues of internal validity, the survey was purposefully designed with an 
attention check and manipulation check, in addition to timing measures for certain questions and 
the treatment conditions. The attention check attempts to reduce the problem of inattentiveness, 
as participants were not allowed to continue with the survey until they fully read the directions 
and correctly answered the corresponding question:  
 
We would also like to know about your favorite television 
programs. 
 
Many modern theories of communication suggest that everyday 
Americans prefer entertainment television programs to those 
carrying the news the television is a passive form of engagement. 
Individuals approach television to relax and minimize cognitive 
effort. To demonstrate that you’ve read this much, just go ahead 
and select both reality and gossip among the alternatives below, no 
matter what your favorite television program is. Yes, please ignore 
the question below and select both of those options.  
 
What are your favorite types of television programs? 
 
1. News 
2. Comedy 
3. Reality 
4. Soap Opera 
5. Drama 
6. Gossip  
 
Ultimately only three respondents failed the attention check twice and were subsequently 
eliminated from the data sample. Survey respondents were given two chances to pass the 
attention check question with a slight change in direction for the second attempt. The second 
attempt was preceded with the text “**PLEASE READ THIS QUESTION CLOSELY AND 
ANSWER AGAIN.”  
The initial goal of data collection was to recruit 600 respondents divided evenly into the 
two treatment groups and control group, but I collected 696 responses from December 12 to 
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December 16, 2014. This enabled me to discard 66 responses without significantly decreasing 
the sample size and thus the statistical power of the study. Respondents were discarded by 
excluding the outliers in the average completion time of the entire survey and the time spent on 
the experimental stimulus (news article) to ensure that respondents were properly exposed to the 
treatment. Ideally, these discarded responses account for inattentive Workers that were not 
effectively treated to the experimental stimuli and Workers participating multiple times from 
different user accounts (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012).20 The low compensation for the length 
of the survey is also likely to discourage this behavior. Survey respondents who spent less than 
five minutes on the entire survey (n = 31), more than 2.5 hours on the entire survey (n=12), less 
than 10 seconds on the treatment article (n=10), or more than 45 minutes on the treatment article 
were dropped from the analysis (n=10). Table 8 shows the number of survey respondents in each 
treatment condition and Table 9 shows the breakdown of each treatment condition by party 
identification. One last concern regards the Workers tendency to focus on the experimental 
stimuli, but deceiving the respondents about the true purpose of the experiment should mitigate 
issues of signaling.  
 
Table 8: Number of respondents by treatment condition 
Treatment Condition Number of Respondents 
Control 230 
Polarized Congress 198 
Polarized Society 202 
Total 630 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I released my survey in batches online collecting 200-250 responses at a time. Due to this 
method of data collection I did receive a follow-up email from a respondent acknowledging that 
he participated in the survey twice. Each survey batch was identically named, but the first batch 
paid MTurk Workers $1.50 per HIT while the second and third batches paid workers $1.70 per 
HIT. This adjustment in compensation was made to better pay MTurk Workers as the average 
time was higher than initial test runs.  
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Table 9: Party identification by treatment condition 
 Control Group Polarized Congress Polarized Society 
Democrats 57.6% 62.1% 55.9% 
Republicans 23.6% 16.7% 25.3% 
Independents 18.8% 21.2% 18.8% 
 
 
Variables and Measurement 
 
 
 In addition to collecting information on demographic characteristics and political 
identities, the survey asks about other background variables such as media consumption and 
political knowledge. Media consumption habits were measured multiple ways. Respondents were 
asked to report on average how often they pay attention to what is happening in government in 
politics. In addition, they reported the number of days in a typical week that they watch, read, or 
listen to news on the radio, on the television, on the Internet, and in a newspaper. Lastly, media 
consumption was measured by the sources they regularly consult to learn about national news 
from a list including CNN, Fox News Channel, MSNBC, Politico, Google News, etc. (Table 10, 
Table 11).  
Table 10: TV News Sources21 
Source N 
CNN 110 
ABC 121 
NBC 93 
CBS 140 
FOX 140 
MSNBC 133 
PBS 51 
BBC 67 
Daily Show 111 
Colbert Report 99 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This question was presented as a checklist in which respondents could select more than one 
answer.  
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Table 11: Internet News Sources 
Source N 
Websites of newspapers, magazines, or radio/TV stations 414 
Google 239 
Yahoo 182 
Political Blogs 70 
Huffington Post 208 
Drudge Report 60 
Slate 55 
Politico 42 
Talking Points Memo 15 
 
 
In terms of outcome variables, the study examines effects of news articles on two aspects 
broad aspects of polarization. The first is ideological and the second is affective. I measure 
ideological polarization through a combination of questions involving polarization perceptions, 
issue positions, and ideological placement. To assess perceptions of polarizations, respondents 
were asked about whether they believed society is in the midst of a “culture war” in politics and 
whether they believe both Democratic and Republican members of Congress and Democratic 
and Republican supporters are moving farther apart on the issues, moving closer together, or the 
same distance they have always been. These questions individually and combined will shed light 
on the extent to which respondents perceive ideological polarization in the country. Questions 
regarding gay marriage, gun control, immigration, and a number of other issues, allow me to 
assess the relative centrality or extremity of policy positions among survey participants and 
whether reading news about polarization changes how people describe their own views.  
Affective polarization was similarly measured a number of ways, including through 
partisan social identification, party favorability, and social distance questions. Social distance 
measures include questions about how partisan intermarriage (“[h]ow would you feel if you had 
a son or daughter who married a Republican?”), the number of friends that share the 
respondent’s political affiliation, and the extent to which the respondent enjoys discussing 
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politics with family, friends, and acquaintances, who either share their political affiliation or 
belong to the opposite political party. Affective polarization also is measured directly through 
feelings about the two parties. According to many social psychology experiments “group 
membership… triggers both positive feelings for the in-group, and negative evaluations of the 
out-group” (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012: 406). This is examined through questions asking 
about party favorability and whether Democrats’ and/or Republicans’ policies threaten the 
nation’s well-being. Survey respondents are also asked a set of party affect batteries, which 
measure the frequency with which respondents have felt specific positive and negative emotions 
towards the Democratic and Republican parties. Finally, the extent to which an individual feels 
connected to his or her political party is assessed through partisan social identification measures. 
These items ask respondents about the extent to which they think of themselves as part of the 
collective and to which their personal feelings are tied to the fortunes of the group. By 
combining all of the above measures, I seek to obtain a fairly comprehensive picture of the 
perceived and felt level of polarization among respondents, and in turn to assess which among 
these factors is vulnerable to influence by media portrayals of polarization.  
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Results 
 
 
This section analyzes the results of my experiment. It is broken down into three sections 
by major themes: ideological polarization, polarization perceptions, and affective polarization. 
The experiment serves to demonstrate the link between the media frame of a polarized Congress 
and American electorate and the extent and perception of polarization in society.  
 
Ideological Polarization 
 
 
Here I will begin with the examination of ideological polarization within society. Much 
of the debate among social scientists concerns whether society is in fact polarized in regards to 
their issue positions. According Fiorina, society tends to be centrist in nature. This was 
reinforced by the average issue position recorded in my sample. Overall, on a basic ideological 
scale with 0 being liberal and 1 being conservative combining all issue position questions, there 
was a mean of 0.467 with a standard deviation of 0.232 (Table 12).22 This demonstrates that the 
average view among the sample is fairly centrist with a very slight liberal lean.23 Opinions tend 
to be distributed in a unimodal fashion, where most are clustered around the most moderate issue 
position (Figure 4). The basic claim regarding moderation includes cases of consensus where the 
position itself may be on one end of the scale, but the key point is that societal views are not 
fractured by a deep divide.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 All issue positions are scaled 0-1 following the same pattern explained above with 0 
representing the most liberal option and 1 representing the most conservative option. Thus means 
recorded as less than .5 can be interpreted as leftward leaning and means recorded as more than 
.5 can be interpreted as rightward leaning.  
23 I am not surprised to see a liberal lean considering that the majority of survey respondents 
identified as democrats, 58.5%. But it’s particularly interesting that even with a significantly 
more liberal sample the overall mean issue position is fairly centrist.  
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Table 12: Difference of Means for Issue Positions 
Issue  Mean Standard Deviation 
Overall24 .467 .232 
Gay Marriage .173 .328 
Gun Control .307 .343 
Immigration .574 .297 
English as the Official Language .595 .340 
Death Penalty .478 .362 
Welfare Spending .449 .308 
 
 
Figure 4: Issue Position Distribution 
 
 
The lack of ideological polarization among my sample was further reinforced by analysis 
on issue extremity (Figure 5). The issue extremity measure is also a compilation of all policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The overall category is a summary measure that combines issue position questions on gay 
marriage, gun control, immigration, language, death penalty and welfare spending. This measure 
and the entire chart is scale from 0 to 1 with 0 being the most liberal issue position and 1 being 
the most conservative issue position.  
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preference questions, but instead of looking at the mean issue position it takes into account the 
extremity or moderation of the respondents’ answers. It aims to gauge the ideological distance 
present in my sample. Overall, issue extremity was fairly similar among all treatment conditions 
with the largest distance recorded in the elite polarization treatment condition and the smallest 
distance recorded in the control group (Melitepolarization = .586, Msocietalpolarization = .561, Mcontrol = 
.574).25 The means show that the sample is not completely moderate, but rather a very modest 
half step in the more extreme direction (Table 13). Breaking down this analysis by political 
affiliation, different patterns emerge. Republican and Independent survey respondents reported 
higher issue extremity distance than Democratic respondents (Table 14, Table 15, Table 16). For 
both Republican and Democratic survey respondents the largest means were recorded in the elite 
condition, for Independent survey respondents the largest mean was recorded in the control 
group. In addition, there were statistically significant differences among issue extremity for 
Democrat respondents in the two treatment conditions and for Independent respondents in the 
control and treatment conditions.   	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This measure was created late in the writing process and does not accurately convey issue 
extremity as the survey questions regarding issue positions vary in number of response options. 
For example, the question about gay marriage only has three options and thus is more likely to 
skew the issue extremity measure as most survey respondents were in favor of the legal 
recognition of same-sex unions. Questions regarding welfare spending and the death penalty, 
however, contained a 7-point scale. The difference in number of response options do not make 
this measure as reliable as possible. With more time, I would recreate the issue position portion 
of my survey, using the same policy preference questions, ensuring that each question had the 
same 7-point scale or number of response options to accurately collect data on issue extremity.  
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Figure 5: Issue Extremity 
 
 
Table 13: Issue Extremity 
 R Mean Standard Error 
Elite Polarization 197 .586 .015 
Societal Polarization 197 .561 .016 
Control 222 .584 .015 
Treatments 394 .574 .011 
 Note: *p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
Table 14: Democratic Issue Extremity 
 R Mean Standard Error 
Elite Polarization 122 .581* .019 
Societal Polarization 108 .526* .021 
Control 127 .543 .019 
Treatments 230 .555 .014 
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Table 15: Independent Issue Extremity 
 R Mean Standard Error 
Elite Polarization 42 .583 .035 
Societal Polarization 38 .539 .036 
Control 41 .636* .035 
Treatments 80 .563* .025 
 
Table 16: Republican Issue Extremity 
 R Mean Standard Error 
Elite Polarization 33 .611 .036 
Societal Polarization 51 .650 .029 
Control 54 .640 .029 
Treatments 84 .635 .022 
 
When looking at the means for each individual question, every question but gay marriage 
and gun control turns up moderate issue positions. It is interesting to note that the average 
welfare spending and death penalty issue positions lean slightly to the left26 and the average 
immigration and English as the official language issue positions lean slightly to the right.27 The 
average issue position for gay marriage and gun control holds a significantly more liberal, and 
somewhat extreme, view on the ideological scale.  
Questions regarding immigration and welfare spending, two hot topics in the latest 
midterm election were consistent with the assumption of a centrist society. The majority of 
survey respondents, 41.8%, took the neutral position, keeping immigration levels consistent with 
current laws and regulations, when asked about the ideal number of immigrants permitted to live 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Here leaning slightly to the left signifies more liberal policy preference such as increased 
welfare spending at the federal level and the elimination of capital punishment.  
27 Here leaning slightly right signifies more conservative policy preferences such as making 
English the official language of the United States. 
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in the United States (Table 17).28 Given the liberal bias in the experiment sample, I was surprised 
to see a pretty even distribution of responses regarding the increase or decrease in federal 
spending on welfare programs. The most popular issue position with 26.2% was the neutral one, 
neither increase nor decrease federal spending on welfare (Table 18). Thus these questions 
confirm my initial assumption and Fiorina’s claim that society remains moderate in issue 
positions.  
 
Table 17: Immigration 
 Respondents Percentage 
Decreased a lot 135 21.6% 
Decreased a little 99 15.8% 
Left the same as it is now 261 41.8% 
Increased a little 75 12% 
Increased a lot 55 8.8% 
 
 
Table 18: Welfare Spending 
 Respondents Percentage 
1 (Spend less on welfare programs) 66 10.6% 
2 55 8.8% 
3 559 9.4% 
4 164 26.2% 
5 106 17% 
6 73 11.7% 
7 (Spend more on welfare programs) 102 16.3% 
 
 
Looking at the distribution of issue positions among respondents, if they were not 
moderate in nature then there was nonetheless consensus. Certain issues such as gay marriage, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 While the majority of respondents reported that they believe the number of immigrants from 
foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be left the same as it is 
now, there seems to be a conservative lean to this question. This is interesting given the 
significant Democratic presence of the sample. Respondents were more likely to be in favor of 
decreasing immigration (37.4%) as opposed to increasing immigration (20.2%).  
  55 
 	  
the majority of survey respondents, 75.6%, answered with a traditionally progressive29 position, 
the legalization of marriage for gay and lesbian couples, but there was significant agreement 
(Table 19). Thus, issue positions are not necessarily clustered around the extremes, but they may 
be congregating towards a more liberal or conservative view as opposed to occupying the centrist 
position. Gay marriage is a particularly interesting issue position to measure in regards to the 
question of “culture war” because this conflict is directly concerned with moral and religious 
issues as opposed to the more traditional economic issues. According to the culture war storyline, 
we should see a significant number of respondents recorded in two categories: gay and lesbian 
couples should be allowed to legally marry and there should be no legal recognition of gay or 
lesbian couple’s relationship. My sample, however, shows a different picture where the majority 
of respondents support the legalization of marriage for gay and lesbian couples with similarly 
small support for the more moderate and conservative gay marriage views. Thus on an issue 
directly related to the phenomenon of the culture war, there is not conflicting extreme views but 
rather a majority favoring a policy of marriage equality.  
 
Table 19: Gay Marriage 
 Respondents Percentage 
Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally 
marry 475 75.6% 
Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form 
civil unions, but not legally marry 89 14.2% 
There should be no legal recognition of gay or lesbian 
couple’s relationship 64 10.2% 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Historically, in the United States, the legalization of gay marriage was not the norm and thus 
support of marriage equality is presented as the progressive, liberal issue position. As of late, 
however, there has much debate about the legality of marriage for gay and lesbian couples and 
may be ultimately decided by the U.S. Supreme Court this summer.  
  56 
 	  
The only issue that seemed to have a wide range of issue positions and a significant 
amount of support in the extremes was the death penalty. Respondents were asked to place 
themselves on a scale of 1 to 7 with a score of 1 indicating strong opposition to the death penalty 
and a score of 7 indicating strong support for the death penalty. The two most popular answers 
were the most extreme options with 22.9% and 17.0% of respondents placing themselves as 
strongly opposed and strongly supportive of the death penalty respectively (Table 20). 
Ultimately the distribution of responses for this issue seems to support the claim of an 
ideologically polarized society as most respondents place themselves on the more extreme sides 
of the scale. This is the only issue position question that displayed this pattern though. Every 
other question had a majority of respondents selecting the neutral position or more moderate 
views.  
 
Table 20: Death Penalty 
 Respondents Percentage 
1 (Strongly oppose) 143 22.9% 
2 73 11.7% 
3 57 9.1% 
4 80 12.8% 
5 99 15.9% 
6 66 10.6% 
7 (Strongly favor) 106 17.0% 
 
  
From the data gathered, the majority of survey respondents occupy centrist issue 
positions or congregate around an agreed upon view, like that of the legalization of gay marriage. 
Contemporary moral and religious issues such as gay marriage and gun control or consistent 
party issues such as welfare spending do not follow a pattern of more and more support for the 
extremities. While the question concerning gun control favored a liberal issue position making it 
more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, 50.2% of respondents, there was still a 
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decent amount of support for the more moderate option, keeping the rules about the same as they 
are now, 38.2% of respondents (Table 21). We cannot definitively say that society is 
ideologically polarized over this issue as there would need to be a significant amount of support 
for easing current gun control laws and restrictions.30 
 
Table 21: Gun Control 
 Respondents Percentage 
More difficult 315 50.2% 
Keep the rules about the same 240 38.2% 
Easier 73 11.6% 
 
Transitioning to average issue positions among respondents based on treatment condition, 
there is slight variation. The elite polarization treatment condition yielded slightly more liberal 
positions (.437) while the societal polarization treatment condition is basically completely 
centrist (.499) on the ideological scale. When issue positions are further broken down by political 
affiliation, there are significant differences between Democrats and Republicans with 
Independents acting as the moderate policy preference (Table 22).  Republican respondents took 
the more conservative position on every policy preference question, with relatively moderate 
positions on gay marriage, gun control and the death penalty, and the most extreme view on 
English as the official language. Democratic respondents took the more liberal position on every 
policy preference, with more extreme positions recorded for the legalization of gay marriage and 
stricter gun control laws, while reporting centrist positions on immigration, making English the 
official language, and the death penalty. The largest differences in mean issue position between 
Democratic and Republican respondents were recorded for the legalization of gay marriage and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This question would perhaps be better suited if this experiment had a better Republican 
presence. Most of the respondents were Democrats who generally support more difficult gun 
control laws.  
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the amount of money spent on welfare spending. Overall, the data suggests that the sample is 
moderate in issue position. There seems to be significant distance between certain political issues 
such as gay marriage,31 but this distance does not extend to every issue. Of the five issues 
represented in my survey Democrats and Independents reported moderate views for four of those 
issues and Republicans reported moderate views for three of those issues. Thus, I can conclude 
that the media’s picture of a polarized American electorate is not an accurate depiction of my 
sample’s ideological distribution. The responses regarding issue position in the survey is 
consistent with Friona’s view of media’s construction of a mythological polarized American 
electorate. 
 
Table 22: Issue positions by political identification 
Issue Democrat Independents Republican N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev 
Gay 
Marriage 368 .086 .231 122 .127 .291 138 .446 .422 
Gun 
Control 367 .191 .285 123 .431 .375 138 .507 .325 
Immigration 364 .505 .277 123 .563 .305 138 .764 .258 
English as 
the official 
language 
368 .508 .323 123 .600 .345 138 .822 .260 
Death 
Penalty 364 .412 .338 122 .481 .388 138 .649 .346 
Welfare 
Spending 364 .352 .259 123 .440 .297 138 .714 .283 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Again, this finding may be particularly significant because of the current political climate and 
the prominence of this issue. In the months leading up to the experiment there was wide 
discussion of marriage equality with California’s Proposition 8 and Defense of Marriage Act, 
Alabama’s Supreme Court and Chief Justice Roy Moore’s denial of gay marriage during the data 
collection period, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s announcement to hear arguments on the legality 
of marriage for gay and lesbian couples in Summer 2015. 
  59 
 	  
Political Approval, Party Favorability and Trust 
 
In addition to issue positions, approval of President Obama and Congress, party 
favorability, trust in government, and the willingness to compromise preferences were other 
important survey measures to complete the picture of society’s view of American politics. 
Looking at the distribution of responses for questions for trust in government, willingness to 
compromise, and job approval, there is an overall agreement among survey respondents, as 
opposed to varying levels of approval based on treatment condition. My sample overwhelmingly 
prefers politicians who are willing to compromise as opposed to politicians who stick to their 
principles no matter what (Mtreatment = .775, Mcontrol = .742). There is a slightly greater preference 
for willingness to compromise among respondents who read news articles about polarization at 
either level, but this finding can not be stated with certainty (p = .318). Despite a vast majority of 
the American electorate preferring candidates who reach across the aisle, most elected officials 
are consistently sticking to their principles. Furthermore this preference for compromise in 
policy-making is highest among respondents in the elite polarization treatment group 
(Melitepolarization = .788, Msocietalpolarization = .767). Thus, the media’s depiction of incivility and social 
distance in Congress adds to the desire for more moderate elected officials. It posits an 
interesting question: If American voters desire candidates who compromise to create public 
policy, why are these actions more and more infrequent in the federal government?32  
Presidential and congressional approval differ slightly in that more respondents approve 
of the way President Obama is handling his job than of the way Congress is handling their job.33 
“Approve” is the most popular response option for President Obama. Fifty-one percent of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This question will be discussed in the next section.  
33 It should be noted that President Obama was not explicitly named or discussed in either 
treatment condition.  
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respondents in the elite polarization treatment condition, 39% of respondents in the societal 
polarization treatment condition, and 41% of respondents in the control group indicate that they 
approve of the way President Obama is handling his job. There is a (marginally) statistically 
significant difference in the distribution of responses between the treatment conditions (p = .091) 
suggesting that the focus on congressional polarization either took the spotlight away from 
President Obama or made him look good (Table 23). Job approval for Congress yielded no 
significant differences among treatment conditions, but contains more negative response options 
when compared to Obama’s approval distribution with a majority of respondents responding 
strong disapproval or disapproval (Table 24). Trust in government, however, is not entirely 
pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in the elite polarization treatment condition, 54% 
of respondents in the societal polarization treatment condition, and 52% of respondents in the 
control group report that they can trust the federal government most of the time. The next most 
reported response was that the public trusts the federal government to do the right thing about 
half of the time.  
 
Table 23: President Obama Approval 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Strongly disapprove 20.8% 22.3% 27.2% 21.6% 
Disapprove 23.9% 33.7% 27.7% 28.8% 
Approve 50.8% 39.0% 41.1% 44.9% 
Strongly approve 4.5% 5.0% 4.0% 4.7% 
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Table 24: Congressional Approval 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Strongly disapprove 35.9% 36.0% 43.3% 35.9% 
Disapprove 52.5% 51.5% 43.3% 52.0% 
Approve 10.6% 12.5% 13.4% 11.6% 
Strongly approve 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 
  
Lastly, overall party favorability for the Democratic Party and the Republican Party was 
impacted in terms of the difference of means and the distribution of responses within the 
treatment conditions and the control group. On the whole, the Democratic Party had higher 
average favorability levels than the Republican Party in both the treatment conditions and the 
control group.34 Average favorability of the Democratic Party was higher and significantly 
different between the treatment conditions and the control group (Mtreatment = .503, Mcontrol = .449, 
p = .015). Favorability of the Republican Party did not a show statistically significant difference 
in means, but just over one percentage point change in the scale higher in the treatment 
conditions (Mtreatment = .308, Mcontrol = .291). This suggests that press coverage of polarization 
regardless of the focus leads to a more positive view of the political parties. This contradicts the 
idea that media frames are influential in shaping public opinion or perception, but as you will see 
in the next section perceptions of polarization is affected by the type of media coverage.  
 
Polarization Perceptions 
 
 
Moving from the extent of ideological polarization present in my sample, or rather lack 
thereof, I look at the perceived levels of polarization. This section assesses feelings about the 
trajectory of the country, assumed levels of polarization in Congress and in society, and Fiorina’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This is not particularly surprising given the political skew of the sample.  
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culture war concept. According to the hypotheses laid out earlier, perceived levels of ideological 
polarization among the American electorate should be highest for the societal condition followed 
by the elite condition and the control group reporting the lowest levels of perceived mass 
ideological polarization. 
While the overall difference in means of the summary measure for polarization 
perceptions was not statistically significant,35 individual measures about the current state of the 
U.S. and the distance between politicians resulted in statistically significant differences (p < .01 
for both questions). When asked “[h]ow do you feel about the way things are going in the 
country?” respondents in the elite polarization treatment group reported higher levels of 
dissatisfaction than the societal polarization treatment group, an eight percentage point change in 
the scale. This finding sheds light on the media’s role in shaping perceptions as the treatment 
group read an article completely concerned with congressional polarization and were 
subsequently more dissatisfied than those who read about conflict among the American 
electorate. Thus the media’s direct depiction of the ideological and social distance between 
politicians played a role in shaping respondents view of the country as a whole (Table 25, Table 
Table 26).36  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I will be using a p-value of less than .05 to indicate statistical significance unless otherwise 
noted. In addition, all t-values reported are results of a two-sided difference of means testing.  
36 This common sentiment of dissatisfaction with the United States was not unique to the 
treatment groups as identical percentages of respondents (76%) in the control group and the two 
treatment groups reported that they were either very dissatisfied or somewhat dissatisfied. This 
question like all questions were scaled 0-1 with 0 indicating total dissatisfaction with the way 
things are going in the country and 1 indicating total satisfaction with the way things are going in 
the country.  
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Table 25: Polarization Perceptions by Treatment Conditions 
 Elite Polarization 
Treatment Group 
Societal Polarization 
Treatment Group 
Polarization Perceptions .575 .565 
Country Perceptions .217*** .292*** 
Elite Perceptions .879* .829* 
Society Perceptions .768 .700 
Culture War Perceptions .53737 .498 
N 198 202 
 Note: *p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Table 26: Polarization Perceptions by Treatment Group 
 Treatment Groups Control Groups 
Polarization Perceptions .570 .559 
Country Perceptions .255 .273 
Elite Perceptions .854*** .793*** 
Society Perceptions .734 .680 
Culture War Perceptions .51738 .531 
N 400 229 
 
Media’s influence is also seen in the responses to the perceived distance amongst 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress. On average, every respondent answered that 
members of Congress are moving farther apart, but the mean was significantly higher in the 
treatment conditions (Mtreatment = .854, Mcontrol = .793, p = .008). This finding emphasizes the 
power of framing and its influence on how politics and politicians are perceived. This suggests 
that the idea of politicians moving farther apart in terms of issue positions is a relatively common 
view among society without the prompting of a newspaper article and that the manipulated news 
articles strengthened the perception of an ideologically polarized Congressmen. When 
specifically comparing the two treatment conditions the difference of means falls just short of the 
conventional threshold of statistical significance suggesting that media is influential in shaping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This question only received 197 responses. Most questions in my survey were not mandatory 
to answer and thus respondents were free to skip questions.  
38 Similar to the footnote above, this question only received 399 responses.  
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perceptions (p = .053). Additionally, the distribution of answers changes with the direct 
discussion of congressional gridlock. In the elite polarization treatment group 80% of 
respondents believed that congressmen are moving farther apart. Only 17% of respondents 
believed that congressmen are about the same distance on the issues39 in the elite polarization 
group, but 30% of respondents in the societal polarization treatment group and 28% of 
respondents in the control group believed that congressmen are the same distance they have 
always been. These findings suggest the news coverage specifically concerning ideological 
polarization within Congress influences readers’ perceptions of Capitol Hill.  
The major question underlying Fiorina’s argument is whether people believe, as a result 
of media’s portrayal of the masses, that the American public is ideologically polarized. Although 
we do not see any statistically significant difference in means, the average opinion of the 
respondents in the two treatment conditions and the control group overwhelmingly believed that 
Democratic and Republican supporters are moving farther apart (Mtreatment = .734 Mcontrol = .680). 
Most importantly, the differences in response distributions between the control group and the 
two treatment conditions were statistically significant (p = .006) demonstrating that media’s 
frame of polarization whether it be about ordinary partisans or politicians led respondents to 
believe society is in fact ideologically polarized. When looking at the distribution of responses it 
is interesting to note that the elite polarization treatment condition reported the highest frequency 
of partisans moving farther apart (Figure 6). Seventy-five percent of respondents in the elite 
polarization treatment condition perceived ordinary partisans to moving farther apart in 
comparison to 68% in the societal polarization treatment condition and 63% in the control group. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “Same distance” refers to the perception that members of Congress are consistent in issue 
distance when compared to a historical context i.e. they are the same distance apart that they 
have always been.  
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Additionally, the elite polarization treatment condition consistently reported the most extreme 
mean in regards to polarization perceptions whether it be that they are dissatisfied with the way 
things are going in the country or that America is in the midst of a culture war (Table 27).  
 
Figure 6: Perception of Movement of Democratic and Republican Supporters 
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Table 27: Polarization Perceptions 
 Treatment Group N Means Std Error 
Polarization 
Perceptions Summary 
Measure 
Elite Polarization 197 .575 .012 
Societal Polarization 201 .565 .011 
Control 227 .559 .012 
Country Perceptions 
Elite Polarization 198 .217 .015 
Societal Polarization 201 .292 .017 
Control 228 .273 .017 
Elite Perceptions 
Elite Polarization 198 .879 .018 
Societal Polarization 202 .829 .018 
Control 229 .793 .020 
Society Perceptions 
Elite Polarization 198 .768 .030 
Societal Polarization 202 .700 .032 
Control 228 .680 .030 
Culture War 
Perceptions 
Elite Polarization 197 .537 .018 
Societal Polarization 202 .498 .018 
Control 229 .531 .019 
 
Looking directly at the question of the culture war, the story of societal clash as portrayed 
in the pages of newspapers throughout the United States, there are small differences in means but 
none are statistically significant. Here what is more interesting is comparing the distribution of 
responses between the combined treatment conditions and the control group (Figure 7). Chi-
squared analysis resulted in very statistically significant difference in frequencies between the 
control and treatment conditions (p = .008). While the most popular response in both the 
treatment conditions and the control group was that the term culture war describes today’s 
politics moderately well, respondents in the control group were more likely to report extreme 
answers—not at all or extremely well. Furthermore, the treatment conditions followed a more 
normal bell-curve distribution with approximately equal number of respondents for the options 
slightly well and very well, 27.32% and 27.57% respectively. Figure 8 provides more detail on 
the distribution of each treatment condition. Interestingly, the society treatment group receiving a 
news article completely concerned with this idea of a culture war reported the fewest extreme 
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answers, but the group with the absence of a news intervention reported the highest levels of a 
perceived culture war (Figure 8).   
 
Figure 7: Culture War Perceptions for Treatment Groups 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Culture War Perceptions for Treatment Conditions 
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Party and Policy Perceptions 
 
 
Respondents were asked to place the Democratic and Republican party on a 7-point 
ideological scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservatives. The results were 
pretty unanimous across treatment conditions with nearly identical means for the ideological 
placement of the Republican Party (Mtreatment = .841, Mcontrol = .841).40 Most respondents 
categorized the Republican Party as conservative as opposed to slightly conservative or 
extremely conservative and the Democratic Party as liberal as opposed to slightly liberal or 
extremely liberal. The most interesting distinctions appear in the distribution of responses 
between the elite polarization treatment condition and the societal polarization treatment 
condition for the ideological placement of the Republican Party (Figure 9). Figure 9 
demonstrates that respondents in the elite polarization treatment condition classified the 
Republican Party as more conservative than the societal polarization treatment condition. This 
was also evident in comparison to the control group in which 36% of respondents categorized the 
Republican Party as extremely conservative. This suggests that the media frame of an 
ideologically and affectively polarized Congress pushes the perceived ideological placement of 
Republican Party farther to the right.41  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The ideological scale was re-scaled from 0-1 with 0 indicating the most liberal score and 1 
indicating the most conservative score.  
41 This finding was only statistically significant (p = .10) for the ideological placement of the 
Republican Party as respondents in the elite polarization treatment condition did not classify the 
Democratic Party in more liberal terms than the societal treatment condition. This seems to be an 
asymmetrical effect that hints to a difference in coverage between the Democratic and 
Republican Party. An interesting new investigation might not only manipulate the polarized 
population, but distinguish between polarization within both parties.  
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Figure 9: Ideological Placement of Republican Party 
 
 
  
Perceptions regarding the policies of both political parties were significantly different in 
the treatment conditions when compared to the control group. Respondents were asked how 
threatening the policies of both the Democratic and Republican parties were to the well-being of 
the nation. Overall Republican Party policies were seen as more threatening than policies from 
the Democratic Party, but respondents in the control group perceived both parties’ policies to be 
more threatening than respondents in either treatment condition (Table 28, Table 29).42 This 
finding seems to suggest that the experimental stimuli, the news articles are having a moderating 
effect. The media frame of a polarized Congress and society is unexpectedly leading readers to 
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42 As expected given the Democratic skew of the sample.  
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Table 28: Do Republican or Democratic Policies Threaten the U.S.? 
 Elite Polarization 
Treatment Group 
Societal Polarization 
Treatment Group 
Democratic Policies .296 .335 
Republican Policies .522** .457** 
N 197 202 
 
 
Table 29: Do Republican or Democratic Policies Threaten the U.S.? 
 Treatment Groups Control Groups 
Democratic Policies .305* .349* 
Republican Policies .489* .537* 
N 399 229 
 
 
Affective Polarization  
 
 
The third set of results concerns the level of affective polarization among the American 
public. According to the hypotheses laid out earlier, affective polarization, both Republicans and 
Democrats increasingly dislike their opponents, will be higher for both treatment conditions, 
with the largest effects believed to be seen among those receiving press coverage focusing on 
polarization within the American electorate. The data suggests some movement in feelings and 
increased dislike of the opposing party similar to what Iyengar found (2012). The picture of 
affective polarization is a composite of four sets of survey questions: social distance, political 
discussion, partisan social identification, and party affect batteries.  
 
Social Distance 
 
The social distance measure was operationalized by two sets of questions regarding inter-
party marriage and the political affiliation makeup of one’s peer group. While the overall 
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difference of means in the summary measure was not significantly different across treatment 
conditions, the rescaled variable indicates somewhat high levels of social distance. Social 
distance was scaled from 0 to1 with 0 indicating no distance and 1 indicating the complete 
distance between ordinary partisans.43 The largest overall social distance mean was reported for 
the control group (Mcontrol = .542), followed by the elite polarization treatment condition 
(Melitepolarization = .535) and the societal polarization treatment condition (Msocietypolarization = .507). 
It is interesting to see the largest levels of social distance reported in the group that did not 
receive any news intervention. This is important for two reasons. First, it stands in for the 
baseline level of social distance among those participating in the study. Due to the absence of 
news about declining friend requests on Facebook and incivility within U.S. government, control 
group respondents were not given added impetus to think about the political parties in us-vs.-
them terms as subjects in the treatment conditions were. Second, it is important because it runs 
against my initial hypothesis that stories about congressional and societal polarization will 
increase the social distance between ordinary partisans as the media frame is incorporated into 
their perceptions of politics and the public.  
Inter-party marriage was only statistically significant when respondents were asked how 
they would feel if their son or daughter married a Republican. Here, we may be seeing a timing 
interaction with the recent results of the midterm elections or with the composition of the sample. 
There are almost no differences between the two treatment conditions, but the differences 
between the treatment conditions and the control group are significantly different (p = .095). 
Additionally, when looking at the distribution of answers for this question ranging from very 
unhappy to very happy, the treatment group is more likely to take a neutral stance. As Figure 10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Complete distance between ordinary partisans refers to a total dislike or even loathing for their 
opponents or the out-group. 
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shows, respondents in the treatment conditions are also more likely to be happy about the 
prospect of their child marrying a Republican. These differences in the distribution of responses 
were not found for the converse, the prospect of marrying a Democrat.  
 
Figure 10: How would you feel if your son or daughter married a Republican? 
  
Lastly, the sample overall seemed to have more Democratic friends, which again is 
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themselves with friends that have the same political identification. The data is consistent with 
this idea as the majority of respondents in the survey were Democrats and the respondents 
reported that a majority of their friends are Democrats.  
 
Political Discussion 
 
Another aspect of affective polarization is feelings towards political discussion with 
members of their own and the opposing party. While there were no significant differences in 
means among respondents, we see the expected pattern by political party in which respondents 
like talking about politics most with friends and acquaintances of the same party and least with 
their opponents. The variable is rescaled from a 7-point scale (ranging from disliking political 
discussion a great deal to liking political discussion a great deal) to 0 to 1 with 0 indicating 
dislike of discussion and 1 indicating liking of discussion. Looking at discussion with 
Democrats, respondents who identified as Democrats reported that they liked political discussion 
with members of the same party the most (Table 30). Republicans reported the highest dislike of 
political discussion with Democrats, followed by Independents who also reported some dislike. 
This pattern was identical for discussion with Republicans as the reported averages for 
discussion with the respondents’ in-group and out-group being nearly identical to those for 
discussion with Democrats (Table 31). Overall, the highest levels of liking for Republican and 
Independent respondents are present in the control group and for the Democratic respondents are 
present in the elite polarization treatment group. The lack of meaningful differences between the 
treatment conditions suggests that this facet of affective polarization exists outside of the 
influence of media. The news articles did not alter the way my sample responded to the survey 
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question about discussion with their in-group or out-group party. The pattern does follow the 
idea of affective polarization as my sample enjoys talking about politics with those who have the 
same political identification to a significantly higher degree than talking about politics with those 
of the opposite political identification.  
 
Table 30: Discussion with Democrats 
Democrats N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 123 .603 .021 
Societal Polarization 113 .593 .024 
Control 132 .573 .024 
Treatments 236 .598 .016 
 Note: *p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Independents N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 42 .448 .040 
Societal Polarization 38 .425 .043 
Control 43 .457 .042 
Treatments 80 .438 .029 
 
Republicans N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 33 .384 .049 
Societal Polarization 51 .389 .040 
Control 54 .426 .040 
Treatments 84 .387 .031 
 
Table 31: Discussion with Republicans 
Democrats N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 123 .377 .024 
Societal Polarization 113 .357 .026 
Control 132 .345 .024 
Treatments 236 .367 .017 
 
Independents N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 42 .397 .042 
Societal Polarization 38 .430 .042 
Control 43 .430 .044 
Treatments 80 .413 .030 
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Republicans N Mean Std Error 
Elite Polarization 33 .636 .056 
Societal Polarization 51 .627 .038 
Control 53 .670 .034 
Treatments 84 .631 .032 
 
 
Partisan Social Identification 
 
 
Partisan social identification questions measure how strongly the respondent feels 
attached to their respective political party. While we don’t see any meaningful differences in the 
overall partisan social identification summary measure, there is an interesting difference between 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. For both respondents who identified as Republicans 
or as Independents, identification was stronger in the control group (Table 32,Table 34). Thus 
the experimental news article was not responsible for increasing the strength of their political 
affiliation. This finding seems to be consistent with the moderating effects discussed in 
connection with the favorability of the political party. Even without statistically significant 
differences in means or distribution of responses, when breaking down the measure into 
individual questions there were larger differences between the treatment conditions and the 
control group for both Republicans and Independents. Neither of these findings were true for 
Democrats who reported stronger identification in the treatment conditions and more specifically 
the elite polarization treatment condition (Table 33). 
 
Table 32: Republicans 
 N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .367 .034 .778 Societal Polarization 51 .355 .025 
Control 54 .414 .030 .122 Treatments 84 .360 .020 
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Table 33: Democrats 
 N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .397 .018 .239 Societal Polarization 11 .365 .020 
Control 131 .371 .018 .630 Treatments 232 .381 .013 
 
Table 34: Independents 
 N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 41 .329 .030 .516 Societal Polarization 38 .303 .028 
Control 43 .337 .036 .589 Treatments 79 .316 .020 
 
One particularly important question within this set of questions for Democratic 
respondents was the statement “I don’t have much in common with Democrats.” There were 
statistically significant differences between the distribution of respondents in the treatment 
conditions and the control group, as more respondents in the control group reported that this 
statement does not describe them well at all (Figure 11). Most Democratic respondents, 59% to 
be exact, believed that they had a lot in common with members of their own party. This was 
similar to the parallel question for Republican respondents, as the results fell just short of the 
conventional threshold of statistical significance (p = .103) with 52% in the treatment conditions 
and 44% in the control group indicating that the statement “I don’t have much in common with 
Republicans” did not fit well at all.  
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Figure 11: Identification with the statement: “I don’t have much in common with 
Democrats” 
 
 
Party Affect Batteries 
 
Party affect batteries are instrumental in understanding overall affective polarization as 
they provide insight into feelings towards the political parties.44 According to Iyengar, affective 
polarization is a combination of positive thoughts and feelings towards one’s political party in 
combination with increasingly negative thoughts and feelings towards the opposing political 
party (2012). People’s views about their in-group seem to be firmly anchored, but what is 
interesting is the movement in feelings about the out-group. For both Democratic and Republican 
survey respondents, in-group positive feelings were lower than out-group positive feelings. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The party affect batteries were coded to create multiple measures in addition to specific 
feelings of happiness, fear, hopefulness, pride, anger, and disgust. These categories include net 
affect (the addition of positive feelings and subtraction of negative feelings), absolute affect (the 
addition of all feelings), negative feelings (fear, anger, disgust), and positive feelings (happiness, 
hopefulness, pride).  
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other words, the Republican survey respondents recorded higher means in terms of happiness, 
hopefulness, and pride towards the Democratic Party than Democratic survey respondents (Table 
35, Table 37). This trend was true for Democratic survey respondents’ positive feelings towards 
the Republican Party. The converse, negative feelings towards in-group and out-group political 
party, follows a more intuitive pattern (Table 36, Table 38). Members of the opposite political 
party have higher means for feelings of fear, anger, and disgust for the out-group. This finding 
seems to be consistent with the long-established motivation that identity development is not just 
driven by positive feelings towards a group, but often negative feelings towards another group 
(Angus, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). This idea combined with the results of in-group and 
out-group feelings demonstrates that negative feelings can be a strong force driving the change, 
in this case affective polarization within society. 
 
Table 35: Democratic Positive Affect 
Democrats N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .433 .015 .719 Societal Polarization 112 .426 .016 
Control 130 .440 .015 .571 Treatments 233 .430 .011 
 
 
Republicans N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .498 .036 .340 Societal Polarization 50 .456 .027 
Control 52 .500 .024 .470 Treatments 83 .473 .020 
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Table 36: Democratic Negative Affect 
Democrats N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 123 .533 .016 .670 Societal Polarization 113 .542 .018 
Control 130 .562 .016 .201 Treatments 236 .537 .012 
 
Republicans N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .688 .022 .733 Societal Polarization 50 .678 .018 
Control 54 .646 .019 .130 Treatments 83 .682 .014 
 
 
Table 37: Republican Positive Affect 
Democrats N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .542 .021 .187 Societal Polarization 113 .504 .019 
Control 128 .553 .020 .227 Treatments 235 .524 .014 
 
 
Republicans N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .475 .029 .596 Societal Polarization 51 .455 .023 
Control 53 .495 .025 .286 Treatments 84 .463 .018 
 
 
Table 38: Republican Negative Affect 
Democrats N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .640 .013 .569 Societal Polarization 113 .628 .016 
Control 129 .633 .013 .954 Treatments 235 .634 .010 
 
 
Republicans N Mean Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .488 .033 .755 Societal Polarization 51 .501 .025 
Control 53 .444 .024 .103 Treatments 84 .496 .020 
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Independent survey respondents, on the other hand, were significantly impacted by the 
treatment conditions. The elite polarization article seemed to have an impact on feelings towards 
the Democratic and Republican parties (Table 39). For absolute party affect and positive affect 
towards both political parties, Independent survey respondents reported higher levels of overall 
affect and positive feelings in the elite polarization treatment group. Negative feelings towards 
the Democratic and Republican parties among Independent respondents, however, were 
significantly higher in the societal polarization treatment condition. This pattern seems to suggest 
that the news article about congressional polarization amplified positive feelings towards the 
parties, but the news article about societal polarization amplified negative feelings. Thus, the two 
media frames utilized in the experiment seem have a good deal of influence over feelings 
towards the political parties among Independents. Independents are less firmly anchored to a 
political identity in comparison to Democratic and Republican identifiers who typically have 
strong and often quite stable attachments to their political parties (Angus, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960). This identity provides a strong anchor for their worldview and framework for 
thinking about politics. The greater movement in terms of party affect among Independents is 
consistent with the fact that they are less strongly motived to like or dislike the Democratic or 
Republican parties. They generally do not have a particularly strong attachment to any single 
political party and thus their feelings and attitudes are more susceptible to changes.  
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Table 39: Independent Party Affect Batteries 
 Treatment Group N Means Std Error 
Democratic Absolute 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .446** .035 
Societal Polarization 38 .322** .035 
Control 41 .386 .030 
Democratic Positive 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .487** .043 
Societal Polarization 38 .357** .040 
Control 41 .428 .035 
Democratic Negative 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .636** .031 
Societal Polarization 38 .742** .030 
Control 43 .686 .026 
Republican Absolute 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .433* .033 
Societal Polarization 38 .339* .036 
Control 42 .422 .030 
Republican Positive 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .474** .041 
Societal Polarization 38 .357 .042 
Control 43 .483 .036 
Republican Negative 
Affect 
Elite Polarization 42 .608 .032 
Societal Polarization 38 .678 .034 
Control 42 .643 .028 
 Note: *p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
Discussion  
 
 
As discussed above, congressional ideological polarization does not serve as a mirror for 
society. In fact, the overarching ideological polarization seen in Congress is not present at the 
societal level. My sample had relatively moderate issue positions in terms of political preferences 
and consensus on issues generally associated with the culture war such as the legalization of gay 
marriage. In addition, analysis of issue extremity analysis only yielded small movement towards 
more extreme policy positions. Affective polarization seems to be at work, not ideological 
polarization. Affective polarization and an us-vs.-them mentality was evident among the sample 
population. Political discussion and feelings towards the political parties were skewed in favor of 
the political party to which survey respondent belongs. In addition, Democratic and Republican 
identifying survey respondents were significantly more likely to have strong negative feelings 
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towards the opposite political party. These findings reinforce Iyengar’s claim that society is not 
polarized along ideological lines, but rather affective ones. Media didn’t seem to play the 
instigator role for Democratic and Republican survey respondents, but it was influential for 
Independent survey respondents.  
Although ideological polarization was not found, the picture of a polarized society was 
increasingly evident in respondents’ perceptions about the distance between members of 
Congress and ordinary partisans. What is perhaps most interesting about these perceptions, was 
that news frame of congressional polarization yielded the largest perceived ideological distance 
between ordinary Democrats and Republicans. Pairing this with levels of satisfaction with the 
U.S. government, the data shows a gloomy picture for citizens. My sample was moderate in issue 
position, with preferences for politicians who are willing to compromise and low approval 
ratings of Congress. Ultimately, these views are compounded by the media’s depiction of 
reality—a depiction in which society is increasingly described to be more and more similar to the 
gridlock on Capitol Hill and a depiction which influences the way readers view politics and 
partisans. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I began this research to understand better the nature and sources of political polarization 
in contemporary American society. Social scientists largely agree that a deep ideological divide 
has emerged in recent decades at the congressional level, but the extent to which this arises from 
or permeates broader society remains a heavily debated topic in academic literature. Despite the 
popular view that a vast cultural divide increasingly separates Democratic and Republican 
voters, it is not clear that there is issue polarization among the American electorate. However, 
there is growing evidence of affective polarization. Fiorina attributes misperceptions about an 
ideological culture war to media coverage, though he does not empirically investigate this claim. 
In this thesis, I sought to investigate whether the news media is playing a role in increasing the 
public perception of ideological polarization and hypothesized that this might contribute to 
affective polarization uncovered by Iyengar and colleagues. Specifically, I undertook a two-part 
study. The content analysis portion looked at trends in media coverage of recent politics and 
found that there was indeed the increasing focus on the American electorate as a polarized entity 
over time. In light of the content analysis results, I then conducted an experiment to understand 
whether the type of media emphasis on congressional and/or societal polarization could change 
feelings and attitudes, convince readers of a culture war, and increase out-group dislike.  
 Ideological polarization was largely absent in my sample as, consistent with 
Fiorina’s characterization of the American public, there was very little issue extremity and 
generally moderate issue positions prevailed. Perceptions and affective polarization, on the other 
hand, demonstrated larger divides. The sample was consistent in reporting that they perceived 
increasing issue distance between Democrat and Republican supporters as well as and Democrat 
and Republican members of Congress. These perceptions were further influenced by the 
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treatment condition in which the frame of congressional polarization resulted in higher levels of 
perceived ideological polarization within both populations. In addition, affective polarization 
was visible primarily in the form of out-group dislike, as respondents’ in-group sentiments 
seemed to be fairly anchored. In terms of feelings towards both political parties, Independents 
were most susceptible to higher levels of positive and negative emotions. Ultimately, I found 
support for Fiorina’s claim that the media is falsely portraying a deeply divided society despite 
the lack of ideological polarization in my sample. The media frame additionally increased the 
perceived levels of polarization among political parties and their supporters. I also found 
increasingly negative sentiments towards out-group political parties consistent with Iyengar’s 
affective polarization theory, but the news article may have only had a moderating impact on the 
levels of affective polarization. This section discusses the implications of media’s portrayal in 
light of the media voter model, next logical step for future research, and some recent news stories 
on the culture war. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
No study is without limitations, and it is important to keep these in mind both in 
interpreting the findings and for envisioning the most fruitful avenues for future research. One of 
the major limitations of my research is the sample size and composition. I did not have the time 
nor the money to gather a large and representative sample to be able to draw broad conclusions 
about society as a whole. A larger sample would not only be better for making generalizations 
about society, but it would enable a better balance of partisans. My sample was heavily skewed 
as 58.5% of respondents identified as Democrats, 19.6% of respondents identified as 
Republicans, and 21.9% of respondents identified as Independents. This sample composition 
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does not lend itself well to confirming which patterns of in-group and out-group like/dislike hold 
for Republicans, or whether there are asymmetric findings with respect to the two parties. Future 
research with a larger and more representative sample can address some of these limitations of 
my study and of course will also carry the benefit of replication.  
In addition to the sample of the study there are further limitations in some of the 
experimental measurements. In the future I would update the issue position question block to 
improve the issue extremity measure. As the survey is currently written, the issue position 
questions have different response options based on the topic. The issue extremity measure is 
skewed from the fact that welfare spending has seven response options, but gun control only has 
three response options. To address this measurement weakness, the new issue position question 
block would contain either an identical scale for each question, or at least the same number of 
response options.  
Furthermore, to build upon this research the next step is to look at different moderating 
variables. In my study, I had initially planned to look at certain independent variables such as 
age, religious importance, media consumption habits, and political sophistication in regards to 
ideological polarization, polarization perception, and affective polarization measures. Media 
consumption habits and political sophistication, in my opinion, could have a significant impact 
on how the news frames are accepted and in turn moderate polarization perceptions and affective 
polarization. Ultimately, I did not have enough time to adequately analyze these moderating 
variables within the context of my experiment; such analysis may provide another interesting 
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piece to the puzzle of polarization.45 This sort of analysis would also benefit from a larger 
sample size, with which it is easier to uncover subgroup differences.  
In terms of the content analysis portion of my research, my argument could be enhanced 
by better data availability. Some of the newspapers analyzed were picked simply due to the fact 
that they had archival data in the given time periods of my analysis. In an ideal world with 
complete information availability, media content analysis could be conducted on a broader and 
randomly-chosen selection of national and regional newspapers. In addition, I could expand the 
regional analysis to focus on newspapers with similar circulation and city sizes to increase the 
comparability of trends throughout the different regions. Having said all this, the trends in my 
data were strikingly parallel across all sources.  
A more detailed analysis of the retrieved news articles might also turn up additional 
insights. For example, one could examine the tone of news coverage in stories about 
polarization, which may be influential in shaping public perceptions. This analysis could result in 
a number of different frames used to describe a polarized American electorate in addition to the 
search terms I used (culture war, Red America, Blue America). Further media content analysis 
could also try to construct a comparison category, to provide a point of reference for the culture 
war searches. One possible comparison category might entail all news stories regarding the 
polarization present at the congressional level.46 While this phenomenon is not debated in the 
literature, it would be interesting to compare news coverage of elite-level and societal-level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 If I had more time I would have looked at the results of my experiment in relation to several 
demographic and moderating variables. The two most interesting ones, in my mind, would be 
media consumption and political knowledge. In the appendix you will find some difference of 
means tests for these variables. 
46 One challenge to collecting this data might be the lack of ready and reliable search terms for 
narrowing the scope to appropriate articles. Discussions of congressional polarization lack the 
colorful catchphrases that have been used to label societal polarization.  
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polarization to see if there are fundamental differences in the type of coverage these two 
populations receive. In the analysis of both news frames, I would conduct these searches over 
similar time periods, but broken down by monthly periods. The monthly periods would enable 
comparison between coverage during election and non-election cycles.  
Outside of the confines of my study, future research on the puzzle of polarization should 
take a closer look at incivility. This involves more than just the affective and ideological 
components of polarization, but open hostility and rudeness between partisans and politicians. 
While this aspect may have been weakly suggested by the experimental stimuli in details such as 
declined Facebook friend requests and the empty congressional cafeteria, I set aside a direct look 
at the role played by incivility. Displays of incivility could be an additional factor impacting the 
extent of affective polarization at both the societal level and the congressional level. For 
example, a decade ago, researchers found that televised political incivility generates heightened 
emotional arousal at the apparent violation of social norms and provokes increased distrust 
toward the political process (Mutz and Reeves 2005). At the outset of the present study, I briefly 
considered including incivility as a separate variable in my experimental research design. In this 
research design option, I would have run a 2 x 2 study that would have featured similar articles 
about polarization with and without references to inter-partisan incivility in Congress and in 
society (Table 40). Stories about conflict and incivility may have implications for political trust 
at the expense of public intrigue.  
 
Table 40: Potential 2 X 2 Design 
Congressional Polarization  Congressional Polarization + Incivility 
Societal Polarization Societal Polarization + Incivility 
 
 
  
  88 
 	  
Implications  
  
 
The widespread belief that society is an ideologically polarized entity may have larger 
electoral implications. The median-voter model predicts that candidates running for office in a 
two-party democratic system will converge on centrist issue positions to cater to the political 
views of the “median voter.” Thus the presence of societal ideological polarization is threatening 
to this model as a divergence in issue positions among the American electorate would incentivize 
political entrepreneurs to cater towards a more popular issue position within their respective 
political party. In the case of societal ideological polarization, the median view for each party 
candidate is no longer the middle and the distribution of issue positions becomes bimodal among 
society (even though this is not the current picture of my sample). Political entrepreneurs in this 
new model are incentivized to take more extreme issue positions to not only win elected office, 
but to inhibit the ability of third party candidates to throw their hat in the ring. In addition, if 
there is a tendency for more extreme candidates, then the centrist American electorate is forced 
to choose between two candidates that don’t accurately reflect their political views. With more 
partisan candidates, a new question pops up: will society adopt more extreme policy preferences 
to match that of political elites or will society remain centrist and underrepresented by their 
elected officials? In addition, the experimental sample showed an overwhelming desire for 
candidates who compromise, but this is inherently impacted by the extent of ideological 
polarization in Congress and perceived levels of ideological polarization in society. With 
increasing issue distances among current members of Congress, voters may believe that their 
views are not being accurately represented. In addition to the desire for compromise, the sample 
reported strong disapproval for the way Congress is handling its job. Given this finding, I am led 
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to ask another question: is the median-voter model able to coexist in a polarized environment, 
whether it be ideological or affective?  
Implications outside of the electoral institution concern the cohesion of society and the 
democratic process. A possible danger of mistaking the media frame of a polarized American 
electorate is the development of increasing hostility towards political opponents despite no 
serious change in their actual policy disagreements. This news frame combined with the 
increasing ease to self-select news sources that cater to an individual’s personal views, negative 
sentiments towards the out-group party will only increase. Partisan news sources routinely 
demonize the out-group party and thus may further the levels of affective polarization within 
society. In addition, biased beliefs about opposing elites will influence the framework that an 
individual uses inside the voting booth. The bias can fail the ideal of accountability in democracy 
via elections as in-group party incumbents are not punished by their supporters incumbents and 
out-group party incumbents are not credited for their policy performance, especially in terms of 
the economy. The perception of polarization and impact of affective polarization may challenge 
the democratic process.  
The media landscape is constantly changing with new technologies, institutions and 
norms. Iyengar and Kinder’s priming and agenda-setting experiments occurred in an 
environment dominated by the 24-hour CNN news cycle and devoid of 140-character news via 
Twitter. Polarization infiltrates the Internet and is strewn across my Facebook newsfeed as my 
peers publicly celebrate International Women’s Day and voice their support for congressional 
and presidential candidates as they proudly change their Facebook status to “I voted.” As 
evidenced by the brief history of newsmaking at the outset of this thesis, the norms of journalism 
are constantly changing. Today, Fox News, a partisan media outlet, continues to dominate 
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Nielsen cable news ratings during an era of objective, non-partisan reporting. Keith Olbermann, 
Brian Williams, and Bill O’Reilly are in the midst of reporting scandals as some of their 
anecdotes were either exaggerations of the truth or offensive to subsets of the population. These 
recent media scandals coincide with an era in which trust in the media continues to decline, yet 
there is an overarching perception that the American electorate is polarized.  
As we take a step back from the data and look at reality, it is interesting to think about 
what the “culture war” means for the future. According to E.J. Dionne Jr., a columnist and 
opinion writer for The Washington Post, the culture war is retreating as the legality and public 
opinion of gay marriage is changing. Support for gay marriage has doubled in the last decade as 
27% of Americans favored gay marriage in 1996 and 54% reported their support in the 2014 Pew 
Research Center survey (Gay Marriage). When this number is broken down by age group, there 
is a visible trend among Millennials accepting and supporting the legalization of marriage among 
gay and lesbian couples. This idea was furthered by the text of President Obama’s 2015 State of 
the Union address which reads “I've seen something like gay marriage go from a wedge issue 
used to drive us apart to a story of freedom across our country, a civil right now legal in states 
that seven in ten Americans call home” (State of the Union 2015). Is this idea of the culture war 
just the end one generational entelechy and the beginning of a new one?  Dionne defines the new 
culture war as one “about national identity rather than religion and ‘transcendent authority’” 
(Dionne). This involves the ethnic, racial, and linguistic norms regulating society, which lends 
itself to the hot topic issue of immigration. Whether or not this new “culture war emerges,” the 
media continues to belabor the frame of a polarized American electorate, where the evidence of 
significant ideological divides is weak.  
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In concluding this project I reflect back to the question Professor Douglas so infamously 
posed. Is it ok to hate partisans of the opposite party or as she scribed “Is it ok to hate 
Republicans?” The lack of ideological polarization is a good sign, but the media continues to 
portray the American electorate as a deeply divided entity. This news frame and the existence of 
affective polarization supports voices like Professor Douglas. These misperceptions and 
overwhelming negative sentiments may threaten the cohesion of diversity within society and the 
democratic process. 
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Appendices  
Content Analysis Data 
 
Red America 
 
 1988-1992 1998-2002 2008-2012 
New York Times 0 4 16 
Washington Post 1 0 31 
 
 
Blue America 
 
 1988-1992 1998-2002 2008-2012 
New York Times 0 4 21 
Washington Post 0 0 39 
 
 
Regional Breakdown 
 
Region States 
New England Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Middle Atlantic  New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
South Atlantic  Washington D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
East North Central  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
East South Central  Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 
West North Central  Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, South 
Dakota 
West South Central  Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
Mountain  Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, 
Wyoming 
Pacific  Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 
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Headlines 
Chicago Sun Times 
• “Family Values Need Protection”  
• “PBS drops film on Catholic Church, AIDS”  
• “Free ideas suffer in liberals’ culture war”  
Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
• “Gingrich: misfire in culture war”  
• “The real issue in culture war”  
• “Shame on us if this happens again”  
• “Religion has its place in politics; drawing the line is the tough part” 
San Francisco Chronicle 
• “Another victim in the culture war”  
• “Ground zero on the tolerance issue”  
• “GOPs out renewing America’s ‘culture wars’” 
The Seattle Times 
• “Political olive branch from Christian right?”  
• “All quiet on same-sex battlefield”  
• “An evangelical divide in debate over torture” 
The Miami Herald 
• “Obama borrows campaign tactics from Bush”  
• “Tweeting trivializes serious issues”  
• “The ‘Culture War’ is real and scary” 
New Haven Register 
• “White House must be high if it thinks war on drugs is defensible”  
• “What about gay marriage?” 
The Houston Chronicle 
• “A fair shake in the textbook debate”  
• “Social Issues: in gay marriage fight, some brands take a stand”  
• “JFK speech under fire in culture war” 
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Experiment Survey 
 
 
Consent Form 
We are carrying out a study of what people think about current issues and politics. We are 
interested in learning what people are thinking about some of the issues that have been in the 
news lately.  
 
This survey is for scientific research purposes only. The data collected will be used solely for 
academic research. Your participation will help us understand better the reception and 
consumption of news in the American public.  
 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked your thoughts and feelings about a range of 
issues. You also may be asked to read a brief news story. Participation is voluntary. You are free 
to withdraw from this survey at any time. You may skip any question that you do not wish to 
answer. We expect that the survey will take 15 minutes to complete and you will be compensated 
upon completion.  
 
Your participation is confidential. The researchers will not know the identity of individual 
participants.  
 
We thank you in advance for your cooperation. Your opinions are very valuable to us.  
 
The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board has determined that this research is 
exempt from IRB oversight. If you have any questions about the research, you may contact 
Molly Block, University of Michigan researcher, at merinb@umich.edu.  
 
If you wish to continue with the study, please proceed to the next screen. By proceeding to the 
next screen and continuing, you are acknowledging that: 
a) you have read the information provided above, 
b) the researchers have offered to answer any questions you have concerning the study, 
and  
c) you hereby consent to participate in this study 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. We will begin with several questions about your 
background. 
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Demographics 
1. What is your age in years?  
2. Gender 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Race 
3. Please check one or more categories below to indicate what race(s) you consider yourself 
to be. 
1. White or Caucasian 
2. Black or African American 
3. American Indian or Alaska Native 
4. Asian 
5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
6. Other 
4. Are you of Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino descent 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Education 
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
1. Less than high school 
2. High school diploma (diploma or equivalent) 
3. Some college/Associate’s degree 
4. College degree 
5. Advanced degree 
 
Religion 
6. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life and, if so, how important? 
1. Not important at all 
2. Slightly important  
3. Moderately important 
4. Very important 
5. Extremely important 
7. Do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or 
funerals? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Do you go to religious services… 
1. Never 
2. A few times a year 
3. Once or twice a month 
4. Almost every week 
5. Every week 
9. Regardless of whether you now attend any religious services, do you ever think of 
yourself as part of a particular church or religion?  
1. Yes 
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2. No 
10. Please choose the religion you consider yourself to be 
1. Catholic 
2. Protestant 
3. Other Christian 
4. Jewish  
5. Other (please specify) 
 
Party ID 
11. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what?  
1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Independent 
4. Other / Don’t know 
12. Would you call yourself a STRONG Democrat, or a NOT VERY STRONG Democrat? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
13. Would you call yourself a STRONG Republican, or a NOT VERY STRONG 
Republican? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
14. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? 
1. Closer to Republican Party 
2. Closer to Democratic Party 
3. Neither 
 
Ideology 
15. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a scale on which 
the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?  
1. Extremely liberal 
2. Somewhat liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Neither liberal nor conservative 
5. Slightly conservative 
6. Somewhat conservative 
7. Extremely conservative  
 
Media Consumption Habits  
16. How often do you pay attention to what’s going on in government and politics?  
1. Always 
2. Most of the time 
3. About half of the time 
4. Some of the time 
5. Never 
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17. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news, not 
including sports? 
 None One day 
Two 
days 
Three 
days 
Four 
days 
Five 
days 
Six 
days 
Seven 
days 
On the radio         
On the TV         
On the Internet         
In a printed 
newspaper 
        
 
18. Please indicate which, if any, of the television news sources listed below you watch to 
learn about national news on a regular basis? 
1. CNN 
2. ABC National News 
3. NBC National News 
4. CBS National News 
5. Fox News Channel 
6. MSNBC 
7. PBS News Hour  
8. BBC 
9. The Daily Show 
10. Colbert Report 
19. Please indicate which, if any, of the Internet news sources listed below you consult to 
learn about national news on a regular basis?  
1. Websites of newspapers, magazines, or radio/TV stations (e.g. CNN, Fox News, 
New York Times, NPR) 
2. Google News 
3. Yahoo News 
4. Political blogs 
5. Huffington Post 
6. Drudge Report 
7. Slate 
8. Politico 
9. Talking Points Memo 
 
Attention Check 
 
20. We would also like to know about your favorite television programs. 
 
Many modern theories of communication suggest that everyday Americans prefer entertainment 
television programs to those carrying the news the television is a passive form of engagement. 
Individuals approach television to relax and minimize cognitive effort. To demonstrate that 
you’ve read this much, just go ahead and select both reality and gossip among the alternatives 
below, no matter what your favorite television program is. Yes, please ignore the question below 
and select both of those options.  
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What are your favorite types of television programs? 
7. News 
8. Comedy 
9. Reality 
10. Soap Opera 
11. Drama 
12. Gossip  
 
Treatment 
We’re especially interested in what people think about current issues and politics through news 
dissemination. The computer will randomly pick on of several news stories from The New York 
Times front page in the past few months to display on the following screen. Please take a 
moment to read the story. When you have finished, you may continue with the survey. We will 
ask you some questions about the story later.  
 
Article Questions 
21. How clearly written was the preceding news story?  
1. Very unclear 
2. Somewhat unclear 
3. Somewhat clear 
4. Very clear 
22. How interesting was the preceding news story?  
1. Not at all interesting 
2. Slightly interesting 
3. Moderately interesting 
4. Very interesting 
5. Extremely interesting 
23. How informative was the preceding news story?  
1. Not at all informative 
2. Slightly informative 
3. Moderately informative 
4. Very informative 
5. Extremely informative 
 
Polarization perceptions 
24. How do you feel about the way things are going in the country? 
1. Very dissatisfied 
2. Somewhat dissatisfied 
3. Indifferent 
4. Somewhat satisfied 
5. Very satisfied  
25. In your opinion have Democratic and Republican politicians moving farther apart on the 
issues, been moving closer together on the issues, or are they more-or-less the same 
distance they have always been? 
1. Moving farther apart 
2. Moving closer together 
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3. About the same distance 
26. In your opinion have ordinary Democratic and Republican supporters been moving 
farther apart on the issues, been moving closer together on the issues, or are they more-
or-less the same distance they have always been? 
1. Moving farther apart 
2. Moving closer together 
3. About the same distance 
27. Some people say we are in the midst of a “culture war” in our politics. How well do you 
think “culture war” describes American politics these days?  
1. Not well at all 
2. Slightly well 
3. Moderately well 
4. Very well 
5. Extremely well 
 
Willingness to Compromise 
28. Do you prefer politicians who are willing to compromise to get things done or those who 
stick to their principles no matter what? 
1. Willing to compromise to get things done 
2. Stick to principles no matter what 
 
Political Discussion 
29. Do you like or dislike talking about politics with family, friends, and acquaintances, who 
are Republican? 
1. Dislike a great deal 
2. Dislike a moderate amount 
3. Dislike a little 
4. Neither like nor dislike  
5. Like a little 
6. Like a moderate amount  
7. Like a great deal 
30. Do you like or dislike talking about politics with family, friends, and acquaintances, who 
are Democrats? 
1. Dislike a great deal 
2. Dislike a moderate amount 
3. Dislike a little 
4. Neither like nor dislike 
5. Like a little 
6. Like a moderate amount 
7. Like a great deal  
 
Trust in Government 
31. How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right? 
1. Always 
2. Most of the time 
3. About half of the time 
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4. Some of the time 
5. Never  
 
Ideological Placement 
34. Recall the ideological scale earlier. Where would you place the Republican Party on this 
scale?  
1. Extremely liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Middle of the road 
5. Slightly conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Extremely conservative 
35. Where would you place the Democratic Party on this scale?  
1. Extremely liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Middle of the road 
5. Slightly conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Extremely conservative 
 
Party Favorability 
36. Would you say your overall opinion of Democrats is favorable? 
1. Very unfavorable 
2. Mostly unfavorable 
3. Mostly favorable 
4. Very favorable 
37. Would you say your overall opinion of Republicans is favorable? 
1. Very unfavorable 
2. Mostly unfavorable 
3. Mostly favorable 
4. Very favorable 
38. Do Democrats’ policies threaten the nation’s well being?  
1. Not at all threatening 
2. Somewhat threatening 
3. Very threatening 
4. Extremely threatening 
39. Do Republicans’ policies threaten the nation’s well being? 
1. Not at all threatening  
2. Somewhat threatening 
3. Very threatening  
4. Extremely threatening  
 
Issue Positions 
40. Which of the following comes closest to your view? 
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1. Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry 
2. Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions, but not legally 
marry 
3. There should be no legal recognition of gay or lesbian couple’s relationship  
41. Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a 
gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules about the 
same as they are now?  
1. More difficult 
2. Easier  
3. Keep the rules about the same 
42. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to 
come to the U.S. to live should be… 
1. Decreased a lot 
2. Decreased a little 
3. Left the same as it is now 
4. Increased a little 
5. Increased a lot 
43. Do you favor a law making English the official language of the U.S., meaning 
government business would be conducted in English only, or do you oppose such a law? 
1. Strongly favor 
2. Favor 
3. Neither favor nor oppose 
4. Oppose 
5. Strongly oppose 
44. Some people strongly favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. Other 
persons strongly oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale? 
1. 1 (strongly oppose the death penalty) – 7 (strongly favor the death penalty) 
45. Some people feel the government in Washington should spend less on welfare programs 
for the poor. These people are at point 1 of the scale. Others think the government in 
Washington should increase spending on welfare programs for the poor. These people are 
at point 7 of the scale. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
1. 1 (spend less on welfare programs) – 7 (spend more on welfare programs)  
46. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement. “This 
country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with 
problems in other parts of the world.” Do you… 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
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Partisan Social ID Measure 
47. Please tell us how well each of the following statements describes you. 
 
 Not at all Slightly well 
Moderately 
well 
Very 
well 
Extremely 
well 
When someone criticizes 
the Republican Party, it 
feels like a personal insult 
     
When I talk about 
Republicans, I usually say 
“we” rather than “they” 
     
I don’t have much in 
common with Republicans 
     
When the Republican 
Party does well in an 
election, I feel proud 
     
When Republicans do 
something wrong, I feel 
personally embarrassed  
     
 
 Not at all Slightly well 
Moderately 
well 
Very 
well 
Extremely 
well 
When someone criticizes 
the Democratic Party, it 
feels like a personal insult 
     
When I talk about 
Democrats, I usually say 
“we” rather than “they” 
     
I don’t have much in 
common with Democrats 
     
When the Democratic 
Party does well in an 
election, I feel proud 
     
When Democrats do 
something wrong, I feel 
personally embarrassed  
     
 
 Not at all Slightly well 
Moderately 
well 
Very 
well 
Extremely 
well 
When someone criticizes 
Independent politicians, it 
feels like a personal insult 
     
When I talk about 
Independents, I usually 
say “we” rather than 
“they” 
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I don’t have much in 
common with 
Independents 
     
When Independents do 
well in an election, I feel 
proud 
     
 
Social Distance 
48. How would you feel if you had a son or daughter who married a Republican?   
1. Very unhappy 
2. Moderately unhappy 
3. Slightly unhappy 
4. Neither happy nor unhappy 
5. Slightly happy 
6. Moderately happy 
7. Very happy 
49. How would you feel if you had a son or daughter who married a Democrat?   
1. Very unhappy  
2. Moderately unhappy 
3. Slightly unhappy 
4. Neither happy nor unhappy 
5. Slightly happy 
6. Moderately happy 
7. Very happy 
50. Roughly speaking, how many of your friends would you say are Republicans? 
1. None 
2. A few 
3. About half 
4. Most  
5. All  
51. Roughly speaking, how many of your friends would you say are Democrats? 
1. None  
2. A few 
3. About half 
4. Most  
5. All  
 
Party Affect Batteries  
52. Thinking about the Democratic Party, how often does it make you feel… 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Most of the time Always 
Happy      
Afraid      
Hopeful      
Proud      
Angry      
Disgusted      
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53. Thinking about the Republican Party, how often does it make you feel… 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Most of the time Always 
Happy      
Afraid      
Hopeful      
Proud      
Angry      
Disgusted      
 
Party Description Checklist 
54. Below is a list of words that people sometimes use to describe political parties and their 
supporters. In your view, which of these words or phrases best describes the Democrats 
and the Democratic Party?  
 
Please check all the options that you believe describe Democrats well.  
 
Care only about themselves 
Think they are better than other people 
Corrupt to the core 
Evil  
Un-American 
Unwilling to consider different points of view 
Whiners who don’t know how lucky they have 
it 
Hypocritical 
 
They once stood for something valuable but 
Have lost their way 
Well-meaning but misguided 
Good at heart, yet blind to what is really going 
on 
Despite their many flaws, they occasionally 
Have good ideas 
Easily led astray by their good intentions 
Reasonable even if wrong most of the time 
On the right side more often than not 
Genuinely try to make America a better place, 
Even if they don’t always succeed 
Better than the alternative 
The lesser of two evils 
Not perfect but our best hope 
They have the right priorities, despite 
Occasional mistakes 
 
Trustworthy 
Tolerant 
Guided by common sense 
Possess the best ideas for the country’s future 
Capable of putting things in perspective 
They stand up for ordinary people 
Willing to fight for justice 
Hard working 
 
 
55. Now think about Republicans. Again, in your view, which of these words or phrases best 
describes Republicans and the Republican Party? Please check all the options that you 
believe describe Republicans well. 
 
Care only about themselves 
Think they are better than other people 
Corrupt to the core 
Evil  
Un-American 
On the right side more often than not 
Genuinely try to make America a better place, 
Even if they don’t always succeed 
Better than the alternative 
The lesser of two evils 
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Unwilling to consider different points of view 
Whiners who don’t know how lucky they have 
it 
Hypocritical 
 
They once stood for something valuable but 
Have lost their way 
Well-meaning but misguided 
Good at heart, yet blind to what is really going 
on 
Despite their many flaws, they occasionally 
Have good ideas 
Easily led astray by their good intentions 
Reasonable even if wrong most of the time 
Not perfect but our best hope 
They have the right priorities, despite 
Occasional mistakes 
 
Trustworthy 
Tolerant 
Guided by common sense 
Possess the best ideas for the country’s future 
Capable of putting things in perspective 
They stand up for ordinary people 
Willing to fight for justice 
Hard working 
 
 
Job Approval 
56. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President?  
1. Strongly disapprove 
2. Disapprove 
3. Approve 
4. Strongly approve 
57. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the US Congress is handling its job?  
1. Strongly disapprove 
2. Disapprove 
3. Approve 
4. Strongly approve 
 
Participation 
58. How likely are you to contact (for example, write, call, or email) your member of 
Congress or some other government official in the next month to share your concerns and 
let the official know your views? 
1. No chance 
2. Slightly likely 
3. Somewhat likely 
4. Very likely 
5. Definitely will contact 
59. Did you vote in the 2014 midterm elections? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
Manipulation Check 
60. Do you remember which of the following answers conveys the main message of the 
article you read earlier? 
a. Decreased levels of polarization in Congress 
b. No change in polarization of Congress 
c. Increased levels of polarization in Congress 
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d. Decreased levels of polarization in the American public 
e. No change in polarization of the American public 
f. Increased levels of polarization the American public 
 
Political Knowledge 
 
Now we would like to ask you a few factual questions about politics. Some people follow 
politics all of the time, others are not that interested in politics. We’re curious about which facts 
people remember off the top of their head, without needing to look them up.   
 
If you don’t know the answer, you may try your best guess or simply select “don’t know.” 
  
61. Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected President of the 
United States under current laws? 
1. Once 
2. Twice 
3. Three times 
4. Four times 
5. Unlimited  
6. Don’t know 
62. For how many years is a US Senator elected - that is, how many years are there in one 
full term of office for a US Senator? 
1. Two years 
2. Four years 
3. Six years 
4. Eight years 
5. Ten years 
6. Twelve years 
7. Don’t know 
63. What job or office does Joe Biden now hold? 
1. Open response 
64. What is medicare?  
1. A program run by the U.S. federal government to pay health care for the elderly 
2. A program run by state governments to provide health care for low income 
individuals 
3. A private health insurance plan sold to individuals in all 50 states 
4. A private, non-profit organization that runs free health clinics 
5. Don’t know 
 
Income 
65. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? 
1. Lower class or poor 
2. Working class 
3. Middle class 
4. Upper middle class 
5. Upper class or rich 
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66. In the past year, roughly what was your household income before taxes?  
1. Under $10,000 
2. 10,000-19,999 
3. 20,000-29,999 
4. 30,000-39,999 
5. 40,000-49,999 
6. 50,000-59,999 
7. 60,000-69,999 
8. 70,000-79,999 
9. 80,000-89,999 
10. 90,000-99,999 
11. 100,000 or more 
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Debrief 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please provide any feedback you like in the space below 
(optional). 
 
This survey is part of research being conducted at the University of Michigan. We are studying 
the impact of polarization news articles on the extent of ideological distance and social distance 
polarization within the American electorate. The news story you read is fictional, but they are 
adopted from recent news stories from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the 
Washington Post. Your responses are very valuable for this research and we appreciate it.  
 
Please contact Molly Block at merinb@umich.edu if you have further questions or concerns. 
 
Please record the following six digit code to be paid for your participation through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.  
 
 
  
  109 
 	  
Societal Polarization Article 
 
 
 
 
A Nation Divided by Red and Blue 
 
Friend requests are revoked, dinner invitations are withheld. With fewer and fewer Americans 
willing to reach across partisan lines in today’s polarized political atmosphere, Democratic and 
Republican voters rarely socialize with one another and even remove (or “de-friend”) those who 
disagree from their online social networks.  
 
Where friendships once flourished in the face of political disagreements, today Democrats and 
Republicans across America tend to travel in separate social circles. Political issues that might 
have once prompted meaningful discussion or vigorous but friendly debate, now give rise mostly 
to shouting or silence. 
 
The ideal of democratic compromise has been vanishing, as extreme voices come to dominate 
the political process across the country. America is being torn in two, red versus blue, by a 
culture war rooted in sharply contrasting core beliefs, values, and lifestyles. 
 
American society has become more ideologically polarized on matters of social policy, religion, 
and the role of government. The ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans has 
widened to an extent nearly unseen since the slavery debate leading up to the Civil War. 
 
Polarization within the American electorate took center stage during the 2004 presidential 
campaign. Democrats routinely attacked not only George W Bush but also his supporters with 
the familiar Red stereotypes – they were, according to the charges, ignorant, belligerent, 
cowboys, and religious zealots. Likewise, Republicans branded John Kerry and his supporters as 
elitists, snobs, lacking conviction and unpatriotic. 
 
The ideological division of society does not appear to be changing anytime soon. Rather the 
splitting of the public along economic lines and cultural divisions looms large.   
 
Although ostensibly a single nation, America is deeply divided by two cultures: red and blue. 
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Elite Polarization Article 
 
 
 
 
A Congress Divided by Red and Blue 
 
The Congressional cafeteria has been empty as of late. With fewer and fewer attempts to reach 
across the aisle in today’s polarized political atmosphere, Democratic and Republican members 
of Congress no longer eat lunch together.  
 
Where friendships once flourished in the face of political disagreements, today Democratic and 
Republican members of Congress tend to travel in separate social circles. Political issues that 
might have once prompted meaningful discussion or vigorous but friendly debate, now give rise 
mostly to shouting or silence. 
 
The ideal of democratic compromise has been vanishing as extreme political voices come to 
dominate the political process in Washington, DC, and state capitals. The legislative branch is 
being torn in two, red versus blue, by a culture war rooted in sharply contrasting core beliefs, 
values, and lifestyles. 
 
Congress has become more ideologically polarized on matters of social policy, religion, and the 
role of government. The ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans has widened 
to an extent nearly unseen since the slavery debate leading up to the Civil War.  
 
Elite political polarization took center stage during the 2004 presidential campaign. Democratic 
leaders routinely attacked George W. Bush with the familiar Red stereotypes -- he was, 
according to the charges, ignorant, belligerent, a cowboy, and a religious zealot. Likewise, 
Republican leaders branded John Kerry an elitist, a snob, lacking conviction and unpatriotic. 
 
The ideological division of Congress does not appear to be changing anytime soon. Rather the 
splitting of Representatives and Senators along economic lines and cultural divisions looms 
large.  
 
Although intended to represent a single nation, Congress is deeply divided by two cultures: red 
and blue.  
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Survey Characteristics  
 
 
PID Respondents 
0 20.19% 
1 23.37% 
2 14.94% 
3 19.55% 
4 7.00% 
5 10.17% 
6 4.77% 
 
PID Control Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
0 20.52% 23.23% 16.83% 
1 22.27% 24.75% 23.27% 
2 14.85% 14.14% 15.84% 
3 18.78% 21.21% 18.18% 
4 7.42% 3.03% 10.40% 
5 10.92% 9.60% 9.90% 
6 5.24% 4.04% 4.95% 
 
TV Sources 
Source # of Respondents 
CNN 110 
ABC 121 
NBC 93 
CBS 140 
FOX 140 
MSNBC 133 
PBS 51 
BBC 67 
Daily Show 111 
Colbert Report 99 
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Internet Sources 
Source # of Respondents 
Websites of newspapers, magazines, or radio/TV stations 414 
Google 239 
Yahoo 182 
Political Blogs 70 
Huffington Post 208 
Drudge Report 60 
Slate 55 
Politico 42 
Talking Points Memo 15 
 
 
Data Tables 
 
 
Difference of Means 
Polarization Perceptions 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .574527 .012 .5534 Societal Polarization 201 .5649028 .011 
Control 227 .5594714 .012 .4629 Treatments 398 .5696665 .008 
 
Partisan Social ID 
CONSERVATIVE # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .36666667 .034 .7783 Societal Polarization 51 .354902 .025 
Control 54 .4138889 .030 .1219 Treatments 84 .3595238 .020 
 
LIBERAL # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .3966942 .018 .2385 Societal Polarization 11 .3648649 .020 
Control 131 .3706107 .018 .6303 Treatments 232 .3814655 .013 
 
INDEPENDENT # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 41 .3292683 .030 .5164 Societal Polarization 38 .3026316 .028 
Control 43 .3372093 .036 .5889 Treatments 79 .3164557 .020 
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Social Distance 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 149 .5345158 .013 .1424 Societal Polarization 164 .5069686 .014 
Control 183 .5421546 .012 .1535 Treatments 313 .5200822 .009 
 
Party Affect Batteries 
Net Democratic Affect # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 196 .3557514 .012 .9272 Societal Polarization 199 .3572408 .011 
Control 222 .3751023 .011 .1702 Treatments 395 .3565017 .008 
 
Democrat Positive # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 196 .4557823 .015 .0722 Societal Polarization 200 .42 .014 
Control 223 .4519183 .013 .0746 Treatments 396 .4377104 .010 
 
Democrat Negative # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .580303 .014 .0746 Societal Polarization 201 .6139304 .014 
Control 227 .6057269 .012 .5799 Treatments 399 .5872431 .009 
 
Abs Democratic Affect # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 196 .4606009 .012 .0371 Societal Polarization 199 .4232273 .013 
Control 222 .444945 .012 .8307 Treatments 395 .4417722 .009 
 
 
Net Republican Affect # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .5875635 .010 .0351 Societal Polarization 202 .5573432 .010 
Control 223 .5878176 .011 .2218 Treatments 399 .572264 .007 
 
Republican Positive # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .5160745 .016 .0196 Societal Polarization 202 .4642464 .015 
Control 224 .5257937 .014 .0520 Treatments 399 .4898357 .011 
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Republican Negative # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .6006768 .012 .5304 Societal Polarization 202 .6122112 .013 
Control 224 .5902778 .012 .2858 Treatments 399 .6065163 .009 
 
Abs Republican Affect # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .4576988 .013 .0785 Societal Polarization 202 .4260176 .013 
Control 223 .4676134 .011 .0764 Treatments 399 .4416597 .009 
 
Democratic Net Party Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .2937641 .012 .8926 Societal Polarization 112 .2962662 .014 
Control 129 .3255814 .012 .0451 Treatments 233 .2949668 .009 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4876033 .025 .2162 Societal Polarization 49 .4471243 .021 
Control 52 .4527972 .026 .7119 Treatments 82 .4634146 .016 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .4307359 .028 .7752 Societal Polarization 38 .4210526 .017 
Control 41 .4323725 .023 .8292 Treatments 80 .4261364 .017 
 
Democratic Absolute Party Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .4761249 .014 .6596 Societal Polarization 112 .4667659 .016 
Control 129 .4633936 .015 .6482 Treatments 233 .4716261 .011 
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Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4225589 .027 .5486 Societal Polarization 49 .4024943 .020 
Control 52 .4455128 .023 .2068 Treatments 82 .4105691 .016 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .4457672 .035 .0150 Societal Polarization 38 .3216374 .035 
Control 41 .3861789 .030 .9880 Treatments 80 .3868056 .026 
 
Democratic Positive Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .4334252 .015 .7191 Societal Polarization 112 .4255952 .016 
Control 130 .440171 .015 .5705 Treatments 233 .4296614 .011 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4983165 .036 .3399 Societal Polarization 50 .4555556 .027 
Control 52 .5 .024 .4703 Treatments 83 .4725569 .020 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .4867725 .043 .0307 Societal Polarization 38 .3567252 .040 
Control 41 .4281843 .035 .9484 Treatments 80 .425 .030 
 
Democratic Negative Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 123 .5325203 .016 .6704 Societal Polarization 113 .5424779 .018 
Control 130 .5623077 .016 .2013 Treatments 236 .5372881 .012 
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Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .6878788 .022 .7330 Societal Polarization 50 .678 .018 
Control 54 .6462963 .019 .1301 Treatments 83 .6819277 .014 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .6357143 .031 .0168 Societal Polarization 38 .7421053 .030 
Control 43 .6860465 .026 .9955 Treatments 80 .68625 .022 
 
Republican Net Party Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .6084071 .012 .2789 Societal Polarization 113 .6277322 .013 
Control 128 .640625 .013 .1540 Treatments 235 .6184397 .009 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4722222 .017 .8370 Societal Polarization 51 .4673203 .015 
Control 53 .4544025 .021 .4989 Treatments 84 .469246 .012 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .5615079 .023 .2474 Societal Polarization 38 .5263158 .019 
Control 42 .5952381 .022 .0567 Treatments 80 .5447917 .015 
 
Republican Absolute Party Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 121 .4567395 .015 .2585 Societal Polarization 113 .4321534 .015 
Control 128 .4592014 .014 .4283 Treatments 235 .4449173 .011 
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Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .493266 .029 .6503 Societal Polarization 51 .4771242 .022 
Control 53 .5251572 .050 .1228 Treatments 84 .4834656 .017 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .4325397 .033 .0615 Societal Polarization 38 .3391813 .036 
Control 42 .4206349 .030 .4256 Treatments 80 .3881945 .025 
 
Republican Positive Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .5418944 .021 .1874 Societal Polarization 113 .5044248 .019 
Control 128 .5529514 .020 .2274 Treatments 235 .5238771 .014 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4747475 .029 .5961 Societal Polarization 51 .4553377 .023 
Control 53 .4947589 .025 .2858 Treatments 84 .462963 .018 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .473545 .041 .0501 Societal Polarization 38 .3567252 .042 
Control 43 .4832041 .036 .1829 Treatments 80 .4180556 .030 
 
Republican Negative Affect 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .640118 .013 .5690 Societal Polarization 113 .6284153 .016 
Control 129 .633075 .013 .9543 Treatments 235 .6340426 .010 
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Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .4882155 .033 .7548 Societal Polarization 51 .5010893 .025 
Control 53 .4444445 .024 .1030 Treatments 84 .4960318 .020 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .6084656 .032 .1407 Societal Polarization 38 .6783626 .034 
Control 42 .6428572 .028 .9754 Treatments 80 .6416667 .024 
 
Issue Positions 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .4369712 .016 .0059 Societal Polarization 197 .499154 .016 
Control 222 .4660285 .016 .9170 Treatments 394 .4680626 .011 
 
Issue Extremity 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .5862944 .015 .2481 Societal Polarization 197 .5609137 .016 
Control 222 .5837087 .015 .5837 Treatments 394 .5736041 .011 
 
Issue Positions 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 122 .5806011 .019 .0564 Societal Polarization 108 .5262346 .021 
Control 127 .5426509 .019 .6042 Treatments 230 .5550725 .014 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .6111111 .036 .3977 Societal Polarization 51 .6503268 .029 
Control 54 .6404321 .029 .8806 Treatments 84 .6349206 .022 
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Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .5833333 .035 .3911 Societal Polarization 38 .5394737 .036 
Control 41 .6361789 .035 .0917 Treatments 80 .5625 .025 
 
Marry Republican 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 194 .5472509 .016 .7495 Societal Polarization 202 .5544554 .016 
Control 228 .5182749 .017 .0949 Treatments 396 .5509259 .011 
 
Marry Democrat 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 196 .6062925 .014 .3133 Societal Polarization 202 .5849835 .015 
Control 227 .5660793 .015 .1031 Treatments 398 .5954774 .011 
 
Republican Friends 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .357868 .015 .3300 Societal Polarization 202 .3799505 .017 
Control 228 .3673246 .015 .9270 Treatments 399 .3690476 .011 
 
Democrat Friends 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .5378788 .016 .0161 Societal Polarization 202 .4814356 .017 
Control 227 .5022026 .015 .7121 Treatments 400 .509375 .011 
 
Country Perceptions 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .2171717 .015 .0012 Societal Polarization 201 .2922886 .017 
Control 228 .2730263 .017 .3650 Treatments 399 .2550125 .012 
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Elite Perceptions 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .8787879 .018 .0529 Societal Polarization 202 .8292079 .018 
Control 229 .7925764 .020 .0079 Treatments 400 .85375 .013 
 
Society Perceptions 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .7676768 .030 .1199 Societal Polarization 202 .700495 .032 
Control 228 .6798246 .030 .1358 Treatments 400 .73375 .022 
 
Culture War Perceptions  
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .536802 .018 .1164 Societal Polarization 202 .4975248 .018 
Control 229 .5305677 .019 .5330 Treatments 399 .5169173 .013 
 
Willingness to Compromise 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .7878788 .030 .6223 Societal Polarization 202 .7673267 .030 
Control 229 .7423581 .029 .3182 Treatments 400 .7775 .021 
 
Political Discussion with Republicans 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .4242424 .021 .6144 Societal Polarization 202 .4389439 .021 
Control 228 .4364035 .020 .8472 Treatments 400 .4316667 .021 
 
Political Discussion with Democrats 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .53367 .019 .3817 Societal Polarization 202 .509901 .020 
Control 229 .5167394 .019 .8309 Treatments 400 .5216667 .014 
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Trust in Government 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 1.267677 .058 .9562 Societal Polarization 202 1.272277 .060 
Control 228 1.162281 .060 .1312 Treatments 400 1.27 .042 
 
ID Placement of Republican Party 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .8375421 .014 .7073 Societal Polarization 202 .8440594 .011 
Control 228 .8406433 .011 .9894 Treatments 400 .8408333 .009 
 
ID Placement of Democratic Party 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .239899 .014 .5435 Societal Polarization 201 .2280265 .013 
Control 229 .2474527 .013 .4034 Treatments 399 .2339181 .010 
 
Democratic Favorability  
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .526936 .018 .0633 Societal Polarization 202 .4785479 .018 
Control 228 .4488304 .018 .0152 Treatments 400 .5025 .013 
 
Republican Favorability 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .3148148 .018 .6045 Societal Polarization 202 .3019802 .018 
Control 229 .2911208 .019 .4292 Treatments 400 .3083333 .012 
 
Democratic Threatening Policies 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 .2961083 .022 .5606 Societal Polarization 202 .3135314 .021 
Control 229 .349345 .022 .0851 Treatments 399 .304929 .015 
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Republican Threatening Policies  
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 196 .5221089 .020 .0253 Societal Polarization 202 .4570957 .021 
Control 229 .5371179 .021 .0549 Treatments 398 .4891122 .015 
 
Discussion with Democrats 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 123 .602981 .021 .7523 Societal Polarization 113 .5929204 .024 
Control 132 .5732323 .024 .3731 Treatments 236 .5981638 .016 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .3838384 .049 .9368 Societal Polarization 51 .3888889 .040 
Control 54 .4259259 .040 .4373 Treatments 84 .3869048 .031 
 
Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .4484127 .040 .6946 Societal Polarization 38 .4254386 .043 
Control 43 .4573643 .042 .6949 Treatments 80 .4375 .029 
 
Discussion with Republicans 
Democrats  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 123 .3766938 .024 .5734 Societal Polarization 113 .3569322 .026 
Control 132 .344697 .024 .4482 Treatments 236 .3672316 .017 
 
Republicans  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 33 .6363636 .056 .8913 Societal Polarization 51 .627451 .038 
Control 53 .6698113 .034 .4217 Treatments 84 .6309524 .032 
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Independents  # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 42 .3968254 .042 .5834 Societal Polarization 38 .4298246 .042 
Control 43 .4302326 .044 .7325 Treatments 80 .4125 .030 
 
President Approval 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 197 1.390863 .061 .1542 Societal Polarization 202 1.267327 .061 
Control 224 1.21875 .060 .1345 Treatments 399 1.328321 .043 
 
Congress Approval 
 # of Obs Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 198 .7676768 .048 .9680 Societal Polarization 200 .765 .046 
Control 224 7008929 .046 .2460 Treatments 298 .7663317 .033 
 
Chi Squared Tests 
How do you feel about the way things are going in the country? 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Very dissatisfied 36.87% 26.37% 29.82% 31.58% 
Somewhat dissatisfied 45.96% 43.28% 46.05% 44.61% 
Indifference 11.11% 18.91% 10.09% 15.04% 
Somewhat satisfied 5.56% 9.95% 12.16% 7.77% 
Very satisfied 0.51% 1.49% 0.88% 1% 
P-VALUE .025 .123 
 
Congressmen moving farther apart? 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Closer 3.54% 1.98% 6.99% 2.75% 
Same 17.17% 30.20% 27.51% 23.75% 
Apart 79.29% 67.82% 65.50% 75.50% 
P-VALUE .007 .016 
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Partisans moving farther apart? 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Closer 21.21% 28.22% 27.19% 24.75% 
Same 4.04% 3.47% 9.65% 3.75% 
Apart 74.75% 68.32% 63.16% 71.50% 
P-VALUE .266 .006 
 
Culture War 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 3.05% 4.95% 8.73% 4.01% 
Slightly well 25.38% 29.21% 20.96% 27.32% 
Moderately well 33.50% 34.16% 32.75% 33.83% 
Very well 29.95% 25.25% 24.45% 27.57% 
Extremely well 8.12% 6.44% 13.10% 7.27% 
P-VALUE .620 .008 
 
Willingness to compromise 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
No 21.21% 23.27% 25.76% 22.25% 
Yes 78.79% 76.73% 74.24% 77.75% 
P-VALUE .621 .317 
 
Political discussion with republicans  
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Dislike a great deal 13.64% 14.85% 17.11% 14.25% 
Dislike a moderate amount 202.2% 14.85% 16.23% 17.50% 
Dislike a little 14.65% 18.32% 12.72% 16.50% 
Neither like nor dislike 23.23% 17.82% 18.86% 20.50% 
Like a little 11.11% 16.83% 17.11% 14% 
Like a moderate amount 12.12% 12.87% 12.72% 12.50% 
Like a great deal 5.05% 4.46% 5.26% 4.75% 
P-VALUE .376 .745 
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Political discussion with democrats  
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Dislike a great deal 6.06% 9.41% 9.17% 7.75% 
Dislike a moderate amount 9.09% 9.90% 12.66% 9.50% 
Dislike a little 16.67% 17.33% 14.41% 17% 
Neither like nor dislike 24.24% 20.30% 18.78% 22.25% 
Like a little 20.71% 20.30% 19.21% 20.50% 
Like a moderate amount 17.17% 17.33% 19.21% 17.25% 
Like a great deal 6.06% 5.45% 6.55% 5.75% 
P-VALUE .889 .710 
 
Trust in government 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Always 13.13% 14.85% 21.49% 14% 
Most of the time 57.58% 53.96% 51.75% 55.75% 
Half  18.69% 20.79% 16.67% 19.75% 
Some 10.61% 9.90% 9.21% 10.25% 
Never 0% .50% .88% .25% 
P-VALUE .791 .116 
 
ID placement Republican Party 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Extremely Liberal 0% 0% .44% 0% 
Liberal 3.03% .50% .88% 1.75% 
Slightly Liberal 2.02% .50% 1.32% 1.25% 
Middle of the road 4.55% 7.92% 6.14% 6.25% 
Slightly Conservative 10.10% 5.94 9.21% 8% 
Conservative 40.40% 53.47% 46.49 % 47% 
Extremely Conservative 39.90% 31.68% 35.53% 35.75% 
P-VALUE .010 .834 
 
ID placement Democratic Party 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Extremely Liberal 18.69% 17.91% 17.90% 18.30% 
Liberal 45.96% 50.75% 44.10% 48.37% 
Slightly Liberal 17.17% 15.42% 17.90% 16.29% 
Middle of the road 12.63% 11.94% 13.54% 12.28% 
Slightly Conservative 2.02% 1.99% 4.80% 2.01% 
Conservative 3.54% .50% 1.75% 2.01% 
Extremely Conservative 0% 1.49% 0% .75% 
P-VALUE .218 .367 
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Democrats favorable 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Very unfavorable 12.12% 11.88% 17.54% 12% 
Mostly unfavorable 23.23% 39.11% 35.09% 31.25% 
Mostly favorable 59.09% 42.57% 42.54% 50.75% 
Very favorable 5.56% 6.44% 4.82% 6% 
P-VALUE .004 .100 
 
Republican favorable 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Very unfavorable 28.79% 32.67% 41.48% 30.75% 
Mostly unfavorable 48.48% 45.05% 32.31% 46.75% 
Mostly favorable 22.22% 21.29% 23.58% 21.75% 
Very unfavorable .51% .99% 2.62% .75% 
P-VALUE .778 .001 
 
Democrats threatening policies 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not at all threatening 39.09% 35.64% 34.06% 37.34% 
Somewhat threatening 41.62% 40.59% 39.74% 41.10% 
Very threatening 10.66% 17.82% 13.54% 14.29% 
Extremely threatening 8.63% 5.94% 12.66% 7.27% 
P-VALUE .171 .168 
 
Republicans threatening policies 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not at all threatening 7.14% 15.35% 10.92% 11.31% 
Somewhat threatening 44.39% 45.05% 38.74% 44.72% 
Very threatening 33.16% 26.73% 26.64% 29.90% 
Extremely threatening 15.31% 12.87% 22.71% 14.07% 
P-VALUE .052 .053 
 
When someone criticized the Republican Party, it feels like a personal insult 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 39.39% 50.98% 42.59% 46.43% 
Slightly well 39.39% 31.37% 33.33% 34.52% 
Moderately well 12.12% 13.73% 12.96% 13.10% 
Very well 9.09% 3.92% 7.41% 5.95% 
Extremely well 0% 0% 3.70% 0% 
P-VALUE .595 .503 
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When I talk about Republicans, I usually say “we” rather than “they” 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 48.48% 60.78% 46.30% 55.95% 
Slightly well 24.24% 19.61% 22.22% 21.43% 
Moderately well 21.21% 11.76% 11.11% 15.48% 
Very well 6.06% 5.88% 14.81% 5.95% 
Extremely well 0% 1.96% 5.56% 1.19% 
P-VALUE .636 .203 
 
I don’t have much in common with Republicans 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 45.45% 43.14% 51.85% 44.05% 
Slightly well 20.20% 33.33% 18.52% 32.14% 
Moderately well 24.24% 17.65% 18.52% 20.24% 
Very well 0% 3.92% 11.11% 2.38% 
Extremely well 0% 1.96% 0% 1.19% 
P-VALUE .653 .103 
 
When the Republican Party does well in an election, I feel proud 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 24.24% 21.57% 14.81% 22.62 
Slightly well 30.30% 21.57% 25.93% 25% 
Moderately well 30.30% 27.45% 24.07% 28.57% 
Very well 3.03% 25.49% 24.07% 16.67% 
Extremely well 12.12% 3.92% 11.11% 7.14% 
P-VALUE .070 .592 
 
When Republicans do something wrong, I feel personally embarrassed  
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 42.42% 49.02% 38.89% 46.43% 
Slightly well 33.33% 23.53% 25.93% 27.38% 
Moderately well 18.18% 15.69% 14.81% 16.67% 
Very well 6.06% 11.76% 18.52% 9.52% 
Extremely well 0% 0% 1.85% 0% 
P-VALUE .648 .390 
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When someone criticized the Democratic Party, it feels like a personal insult 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 48.78% 53.10% 50.38% 50.85% 
Slightly well 25.20% 23.01% 27.48% 24.15% 
Moderately well 17.89% 15.04% 12.21% 16.53% 
Very well 5.69% 7.08% 8.40% 6.36% 
Extremely well 2.44% 1.77% 1.53% 2.12% 
P-VALUE .921 .723 
 
When I talk about Democrats, I usually say “we” rather than “they” 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 52.03% 55.75% 55.73% 53.81% 
Slightly well 15.45% 18.58% 17.56% 16.95% 
Moderately well 18.70% 16.81% 14.50% 17.80% 
Very well 8.94% 7.08% 6.87% 8.05% 
Extremely well 4.88% 1.77 5.34% 3.39% 
P-VALUE .637 .815 
 
I don’t have much in common with Democrats 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 63.93% 54.46% 43.51% 59.40% 
Slightly well 22.95% 23.21% 32.06% 23.08% 
Moderately well 9.02% 19.64% 14.50% 14.10% 
Very well 4.10% 1.79% 8.40% 2.99% 
Extremely well 0% .89% 1.53% .43% 
P-VALUE .104 .013 
 
When the Democratic Party does well in an election, I feel proud 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 19.67% 25.66% 22.14% 22.55% 
Slightly well 27.05% 24.78% 27.48% 25.96% 
Moderately well 27.05% 18.58% 25.19% 22.98% 
Very well 17.21% 20.35% 17.56% 18.72% 
Extremely well 9.02% 10.62% 7.63% 9.79% 
P-VALUE .502 .945 
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When Democrats do something wrong, I feel personally embarrassed  
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 44.72% 51.79% 45.80% 48.09% 
Slightly well 32.52% 25.89% 24.43% 29.36% 
Moderately well 13.01% 14.29% 16.79% 13.62% 
Very well 6.50% 7.14% 9.16% 6.81% 
Extremely well 3.25% .89% 3.82% 2.13% 
P-VALUE .537 .575 
 
When someone criticized the Independent Party, it feels like a personal insult 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 69.05% 76.32% 74.42% 72.50% 
Slightly well 11.90% 18.42% 4.65% 15% 
Moderately well 16.67% 5.26% 13.95% 11.25% 
Very well 2.38 0% 4.65% 1.25% 
Extremely well 0% 0% 2.33% 0% 
P-VALUE .270 .199 
 
When I talk about Independents, I usually say “we” rather than “they” 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 59.52% 68.42% 67.44% 63.75% 
Slightly well 19.05% 13.16% 11.63% 16.25% 
Moderately well 14.29% 10.53% 9.30% 12.50% 
Very well 7.14% 7.89% 9.30% 7.50% 
Extremely well 0% 0% 2.33% 0% 
P-VALUE .822 .611 
 
I don’t have much in common with Independents 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 35.71% 47.37% 44.19% 41.25% 
Slightly well 21.43% 26.32% 23.26% 23.75% 
Moderately well 38.10% 15.79% 16.28% 27.50% 
Very well 4.76% 7.89% 6.98% 6.25% 
Extremely well 0% 2.63% 9.30% 1.25% 
P-VALUE .208 .196 
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When Independents do well in an election, I feel proud 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Not well at all 41.46% 52.63% 34.88% 46.84% 
Slightly well 21.95% 21.05% 25.58% 21.52% 
Moderately well 18.51% 13.16% 23.26% 16.46% 
Very well 12.20% 10.53% 6.98% 11.39% 
Extremely well 4.88% 2.63% 9.30% 3.80% 
P-VALUE .857 .428 
 
Marry Republican 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Very unhappy 2.06% 1.49% 5.70% 1.77% 
Moderately unhappy 4.64% 5.45% 7.46% 5.05% 
Slightly unhappy 11.34% 11.39% 14.91% 11.36% 
Neither unhappy nor happy 57.73% 55.45% 43.42% 56.57% 
Slightly happy 3.61% 3.47% 7.46% 3.54% 
Moderately happy 10.31% 12.38% 12.72% 11.36% 
Very happy 10.31% 10.40% 8.33% 10.35% 
P-VALUE .993 .003 
 
Marry Democrat 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Very unhappy 0.51% 1.98% 3.08% 1.26% 
Moderately unhappy 1.53% 3.96% 4.41% 2.76% 
Slightly unhappy 4.59% 4.46% 7.93% 4.52% 
Neither unhappy nor happy 57.65% 54.95% 50.66% 56.28% 
Slightly happy 9.69% 10.89% 11.01% 10.30% 
Moderately happy 14.80% 12.87% 14.10% 13.82% 
Very happy 11.22% 10.89% 9.81% 11.06% 
P-VALUE .625 .223 
 
Republican Friends 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
None 9.14% 10.40% 10.53% 9.77% 
A few 53.81% 48.02% 49.56% 50.88% 
About half 22.34% 21.29% 22.81% 22.80% 
Most 14.21% 19.80% 16.67% 17.04% 
All 0.51% 0.50% 0.44% 0.50% 
P-VALUE .610 .994 
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Democratic Friends 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
None 2.53% 3.47% 2.64% 3% 
A few 25.25% 34.65% 31.28% 30% 
About half 30.30% 30.69% 31.72% 30.5% 
Most 38.38% 28.22% 31.28% 33.35% 
All 3.54% 2.97% 3.08% 3.25% 
P-VALUE .168 .983 
 
Democratic Party Happy 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 21.72% 25.37% 26.43% 23.56% 
Seldom 20.71% 31.34% 30.40% 26.07% 
Sometimes 40.91% 31.34% 31.72% 36.09% 
Most of the time 13.13% 9.95% 9.69% 11.53% 
Always 3.54% 1.99% 1.76% 2.76% 
P-VALUE .057 .506 
 
Democratic Party Afraid 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 43.65% 45.54% 39.65% 44.61% 
Seldom 30.96% 27.72% 28.19% 29.32% 
Sometimes 16.75% 21,29% 20.70% 19.05% 
Most of the time 4.57% 4.95% 9.69% 4.76% 
Always 4.06% 0.50% 1.76% 2.26% 
P-VALUE .127 .156 
 
Democratic Party Hopeful 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 19.29% 26.87% 25.11% 23.12% 
Seldom 20.81% 20.90% 27.31% 20.85% 
Sometimes 34.52% 33.83% 29.96% 34.17% 
Most of the time 21.32% 14.93% 14.98% 18.09% 
Always 4.06% 3.48% 2.64% 3.77% 
P-VALUE .306 .288 
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Democratic Party Proud 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 27.78% 34.16% 32.46% 31% 
Seldom 20.71% 27.23% 28.95% 24% 
Sometimes 37.88% 26.24% 27.63% 32% 
Most of the time 11.62% 10.40% 9.65% 11% 
Always 2.02% 1.98% 1.32% 2% 
P-VALUE .114 .553 
 
Democratic Party Angry 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 21.21% 20.90% 17.78% 21.05% 
Seldom 30.30% 25.87% 28% 28.07% 
Sometimes 34.85% 41.79% 36.44% 38.35% 
Most of the time 9.09% 9.95% 13.78% 9.52% 
Always 4.55% 1.49% 4% 3.01% 
P-VALUE .275 .450 
 
Democratic Party Disgusted 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 32.32% 26.24% 25% 29.25% 
Seldom 27.27% 27.23% 27.63% 27.25% 
Sometimes 28.28% 33.66% 30.26% 31% 
Most of the time 8.08% 10.40% 10.53% 9.25% 
Always 4.04% 2.48% 6.58% 3.25% 
P-VALUE .473 .305 
 
Republican Party Happy 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 42.13% 42.57% 49.11% 42.36% 
Seldom 35.03% 32.18% 26.79% 33.58% 
Sometimes 20.30% 20.30% 18.75% 20.30% 
Most of the time 2.03% 4.46% 3.57% 3.26% 
Always .051% .050% 1.79% .50% 
P-VALUE .727 .180 
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Republican Party Afraid 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 20.81% 29.21% 17.78% 25.06% 
Seldom 20.81% 23.76% 26.22% 22.31% 
Sometimes 35.03% 31.19% 29.33% 33.08% 
Most of the time 15.23% 12.87% 17.78% 14.04% 
Always 8.12% 2.97% 8.89% 5.51% 
P-VALUE .065 .069 
 
Republican Party Hopeful 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 42.64% 43.56% 48% 43.11% 
Seldom 32.99% 27.72% 26.22% 30.33% 
Sometimes 18.78% 19.31% 16.89% 19.05% 
Most of the time 4.57% 7.92% 6.67% 6.27% 
Always 1.02% 1.49% 2.22% 1.25% 
P-VALUE .573 .583 
 
Republican Party Proud 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 53.81% 50.99% 55.11% 52.38% 
Seldom 24.87% 23.76% 24.89% 24.31% 
Sometimes 18.27% 19.31% 13.78% 18.80% 
Most of the time 2.03% 5.45% 3.56% 3.76% 
Always 1.02% 0.50% 2.67% 0.75% 
P-VALUE .446 .197 
 
Republican Party Angry 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 9.64% 14.85% 12.05% 12.28% 
Seldom 19.29% 18.32% 16.52% 18.80% 
Sometimes 32.99% 40.10% 31.70% 36.59% 
Most of the time 30.46% 20.30% 27.68% 25.31% 
Always 7.61% 6.44% 12.05% 7.02% 
P-VALUE .096 .212 
 
  
  134 
 	  
Republican Party Disgusted 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Never 11.17% 17.82% 12.44% 14.54% 
Seldom 22.34% 18.81% 18.22% 20.55% 
Sometimes 36.14% 36.14% 29.78% 32.33% 
Most of the time 19.80% 19.80% 23.11% 23.56% 
Always 7.43% 7.43% 16.44% 9.02% 
P-VALUE .059 .094 
 
Job Approval Obama 
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Strongly disapprove 20.81% 22.28% 27.23% 21.55% 
Disapprove 23.86% 33.66% 27.68% 28.82% 
Approve 50.76% 39.11% 41.07% 44.86% 
Strongly approve 4.57% 4.95% 4.02% 4.76% 
P-VALUE .091 .444 
 
Job Approval Congress   
 Elite 
Polarization 
Societal 
Polarization 
Control Treatment 
Strongly disapprove 35.86% 36% 43.3% 35.93% 
Disapprove 52.53% 51.5% 43.3% 52.01% 
Approve 10.61% 12.5% 13.39% 11.56% 
Strongly approve 1.01% 0% 0% .5% 
P-VALUE .503 .124 
 
Difference of Means Moderating Variables 
Polarization Perceptions 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 100 .5618182 .016 .3639 Societal Polarization 97 .5407685 .017 
Control 126 .52886 .016 .2399 Treatments 197 .5514536 .012 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .5876289 .017 .9924 Societal Polarization 104 .5874126 .015 
Control 101 .5976598 .017 .6081 Treatments 201 .587517 .011 
 
  
  135 
 	  
Partisan Social ID 
Conservatives 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 18 .3055556 .042 .9580 Societal Polarization 19 .3026316 .036 
Control 27 .3796296 .051 .1656 Treatments 37 .3040541 .027 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 15 .44 .050 .3699 Societal Polarization 32 .3859375 .034 
Control 27 .4481482 .032 .3092 Treatments 47 .4031915 .028 
 
Liberals 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 60 .3466667 .024 .7275 Societal Polarization 55 .3345455 .025 
Control 67 .3559702 .026 .6168 Treatments 115 .3408696 .017 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 61 .4459016 .026 .2019 Societal Polarization 56 .3946429 .031 
Control 64 .3859375 .025 .2832 Treatments 117 .4213675 .020 
 
Independents 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 22 .2670455 .027 .2377 Societal Polarization 24 .3229167 .037 
Control 33 .3484848 .040 .2324 Treatments 46 .2961957 .023 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 19 .4013158 .052 .0659 Societal Polarization 14 .2678571 .040 
Control 10 .3 .087 .5824 Treatments 33 .344697 .036 
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Social Distance 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 74 .5067568 .017 .7513 Societal Polarization 74 .4980695 .022 
Control 94 .550152 .018 .0347 Treatments 148 .5024131 .014 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 75 .5619048 .019 .0641 Societal Polarization 90 .5142857 .017 
Control 89 .5337079 .016 .9164 Treatments 165 .5359307 .013 
 
Issue Positions 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 101 .4269802 .020 .0215 Societal Polarization 97 .4974227 .023 
Control 125 .469 .022 .7723 Treatments 198 .4614899 .015 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 96 .4474826 .025 .1106 Societal Polarization 100 .5008333 .022 
Control 97 .4621993 .025 .6739 Treatments 196 .4747024 .017 
 
Marry Republican 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 99 .5488215 .200 .4915 Societal Polarization 98 .5289116 .206 
Control 127 .507874 .259 .2287 Treatments 197 .5389171 .202 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 95 .545614 .246 .3423 Societal Polarization 104 .5785256 .241 
Control 101 .5313531 .024 .2919 Treatments 199 .5628141 .017 
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Marry Democrat 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 100 .6033333 .019 .0392 Societal Polarization 98 .5459184 .020 
Control 127 .5380577 .237 .1289 Treatments 198 .5749158 .200 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 96 .609375 .021 .6942 Societal Polarization 104 .6217949 .023 
Control 100 .6016667 .021 .5962 Treatments 200 .6158333 .016 
 
Republican Friends 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 100 .3475 .020 .4385 Societal Polarization 98 .372449 .025 
Control 127 .3425197 .020 .5025 Treatments 198 .3598485 .016 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .3685567 .023 .5650 Societal Polarization 104 .3870192 .022 
Control 101 .3985149 .022 .4573 Treatments 201 .3781095 .016 
 
Democrat Friends 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 101 .5321782 .023 .0099 Societal Polarization 98 .4438776 .025 
Control 127 .503937 .022 .5826 Treatments 199 .4886935 .017 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .5438144 .231 .3985 Societal Polarization 104 .5168269 .221 
Control 100 .5 .021 .2721 Treatments 201 .5298507 .016 
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Country Perceptions 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 101 .2079208 .020 .0026 Societal Polarization 97 .3041237 .025 
Control 127 .265748 .023 .6932 Treatments 198 .2550505 .016 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .2268041 .023 .1078 Societal Polarization 104 .28125 .024 
Control 101 .2821782 .024 .3559 Treatments 201 .2549751 .017 
 
Elite Perceptions 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 101 .8663366 .025 .0425 Societal Polarization 98 .7908163 .027 
Control 128 .7695313 .027 .0594 Treatments 199 .8291457 .019 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .8917526 .027 .4520 Societal Polarization 104 .8653846 .024 
Control 101 .8217822 .032 .0932 Treatments 201 .8781095 .017 
 
Society Perceptions 
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 101 .7623762 .041 .0962 Societal Polarization 98 .6581633 .047 
Control 127 .6377953 .041 .1507 Treatments 199 .7110553 .031 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .7731959 .042 .5827 Societal Polarization 104 .7403846 .042 
Control 101 .7326733 .041 .6458 Treatments 201 .7562189 .030 
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Culture War Perceptions  
Low Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 100 .5175 .026 .1193 Societal Polarization 98 .4617347 .024 
Control 128 .4882813 .026 .9575 Treatments 198 .489899 .018 
 
High Media 
Consumption 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 97 .556701 .024 .4641 Societal Polarization 104 .53125 .025 
Control 101 .5841584 .027 .1934 Treatments 201 .5435323 .017 
 
Polarization Perceptions 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 111 .5839476 .016 .6833 Societal Polarization 99 .5748393 .016 
Control 115 .5328063 .017 .0169 Treatments 210 .5796537 .011 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .5623679 .017 .7655 Societal Polarization 102 .5552585 .016 
Control 112 .5868507 .016 .1486 Treatments 188 .5585106 .012 
 
Partisan Social ID 
Conservatives 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 14 .35 .055 .8773 Societal Polarization 19 .3605263 .041 
Control 24 .425 .049 .2322 Treatments 33 .3560606 .033 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 19 .3789474 .043 .6139 Societal Polarization 32 .3515625 .033 
Control 30 .405 .038 .3346 Treatments 51 .3617647 .026 
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Liberals 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 70 .3771429 .025 .9941 Societal Polarization 54 .3768519 .030 
Control 64 .3976563 .027 .5345 Treatments 124 .3770161 .019 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 51 .4235294 .025 .0621 Societal Polarization 54 .3535088 .027 
Control 67 .3447761 .024 .1709 Treatments 108 .3865741 .019 
 
Independents 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 25 .2975 .035 .7488 Societal Polarization 26 .28125 .036 
Control 28 .3169643 .045 .5613 Treatments 51 .2892157 .025 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 16 .3789063 .053 .6668 Societal Polarization 12 .3489583 .036 
Control 15 .375 .060 .8889 Treatments 28 .3660714 .034 
 
Social Distance 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 80 .5321429 .016 .2769 Societal Polarization 74 .5028958 .021 
Control 88 .5275974 .019 .6760 Treatments 154 .5180891 .013 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 69 .5372671 .020 .3114 Societal Polarization 90 .5103175 .017 
Control 95 .5556391 .016 .1110 Treatments 159 .5220126 .013 
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Issue Positions 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 111 .4331832 .017 .0147 Societal Polarization 96 .5008681 .022 
Control 113 .4605457 .021 .8676 Treatments 207 .4645733 .014 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .4418605 .029 .1301 Societal Polarization 101 .4975248 .023 
Control 109 .4717125 .026 .9946 Treatments 187 .4719251 .018 
 
Marry Republican 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 109 .5489297 .021 .3714 Societal Polarization 100 .5216667 .022 
Control 116 .5143678 .022 .4141 Treatments 209 .5358852 .015 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 85 .545098 .025 .2168 Societal Polarization 102 .5866013 .022 
Control 112 .5223217 .025 .1185 Treatments 187 .5677362 .017 
 
Marry Democrat 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 110 .6181818 .019 .0626 Societal Polarization 100 .565 .021 
Control 116 .5617816 .022 .2165 Treatments 210 .5928571 .014 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .5910853 .022 .6695 Societal Polarization 102 .6045752 .023 
Control 111 .5705706 .021 .2844 Treatments 188 .5984043 .016 
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Republican Friends 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 111 .3175676 .019 .2772 Societal Polarization 100 .35 .023 
Control 116 .3448276 .022 .6446 Treatments 211 .3329384 .015 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .4098837 .024 .9866 Societal Polarization 102 .4093137 .023 
Control 112 .390625 .020 .4824 Treatments 188 .4095745 .017 
 
Democrat Friends 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 112 .5580357 .022 .0005 Societal Polarization 100 .4425 .024 
Control 116 .4827586 .023 .4628 Treatments 212 .5035377 .017 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .5116279 .024 .8079 Societal Polarization 102 .5196078 .022 
Control 111 .5225225 .021 .8043 Treatments 188 .5159574 .016 
 
Country Perceptions 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 112 .2366071 .021 .0494 Societal Polarization 99 .3005051 .025 
Control 116 .2758621 .024 7434. Treatments 211 .2665877 .016 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .1918605 .022 .0057 Societal Polarization 102 .2843137 .024 
Control 112 .2700893 .023 .3148 Treatments 188 .2420213 .017 
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Elite Perceptions 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 112 .8794643 .023 .0478 Societal Polarization 100 .81 .026 
Control 116 .7155175 .032 .0001 Treatments 212 .8466981 .018 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .877907 .029 .4297 Societal Polarization 102 .8480392 .025 
Control 113 .8716814 .023 .7416 Treatments 188 .8617021 .019 
 
Society Perceptions 
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 112 .7857143 .038 .3782 Societal Polarization 100 .735 .043 
Control 115 .5956522 .042 .0010 Treatments 212 .7617925 .029 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .744186 .046 .2369 Societal Polarization 102 .6666667 .046 
Control 113 .7654867 .039 .2211 Treatments 188 .7021277 .033 
 
Culture War Perceptions  
Low Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 111 .5315315 .023 .5197 Societal Polarization 100 .51 .024 
Control 116 .5344828 .027 .6622 Treatments 211 .521327 .017 
 
High Political 
Knowledge 
 # of 
Obs 
Means Std Error p-value 
Elite Polarization 86 .5436047 .027 .1243 Societal Polarization 102 .4852941 .026 
Control 113 .5265487 .027 .6488 Treatments 188 .5119681 .019 
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Figure 12: Issue Extremity by Treatment Group 
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